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Abstract
The aim of this work is to develop an alternative evolutionary approach to as-
sessing the performance of co-operative organizations. The focus of investigation
is turned to the co-operative organization as a group of members in a market en-
vironment containing non-members. Signiﬁcant unique features of the co-operative
organization is illustrated at ﬁrst. After reviewing historical aspects of evolution
theories and their positioning in biology, economic and social sciences, alternative
notions of evolution and the osmosis of ideas is suggested. Further on, a concept for
the evolutionary function of exit, voice and acquiesce strategies in social contexts is
developed analog to the biological concept of ﬁght, ﬂight or cope reactions. Leaning
on the known social and group-psychological features of the co-operative organiza-
tions species, and on the assumption of membership rationality at the individual
member's level, a theory of exit, voice or acquiesce decisions, and the inﬂuence of
the group's size on their results, is being introduced. A following empirical dy-
namic model will utilize the previous recognitions achieved, to demonstrate the
eﬀect of ommanent restrictions to group-growth. Moreover it is being proven, that
the co-operative organization can still be considered as successive, in the populations
ecological as well as in the social sense, even if it is not growing. A corrected ap-
proach to the utilization of group growth as indicator for co-operative performance
is suggested as a result.
Keywords:
Cooperatives, Economic Evolution, Populations Ecology, Organizational Growth,
Exit or Voice, Fight or Flight, Rationality, Memes

Zusammenfassung
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Entwicklung eines alternativen evolutionären Ansatzes
zur Bewertung der Leistung genossenschaftlicher Organisationen. Im Mittelpunkt
der Untersuchung steht die genossenschaftliche Organisation als Gruppe von Mitglie-
dern in einer aus Nicht-Mitgliedern bestehenden Marktumgebung. Einleitend werden
für die Untersuchung elementare Eigenschaften der genossenschaftlichen Organisa-
tion geschildert. Nach einer Übersicht historischer Aspekte der Evolutionstheorien
und ihrer Positionierung in der Biologie, den Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften,
wird eine neue Vorstellung der Evolution und der Osmose von Ideen vorgeschlagen.
Weiterhin wird ein Konzept für die evolutorischen Funktionen der strategischen Ab-
wanderung/ Widerspruch/ Duldung in sozialen Zusammenhängen, als Analogie zum
biologischen Konzept von Fight, Flight or Cope-Reaktionen präsentiert. Anlehnend
an anerkannten sozialen und gruppenpsychologischen Eigenschaften der Genossen-
schaften und an die Annahme der Rationalität der Mitgliedschaft auf der Ebene
des individuellen Mitglieds, wird eine Theorie über Abwanderung, Widerspruch und
Duldung, und über den Einﬂuss der Gruppengröße auf deren Ergebnis, vorgestellt.
Die zuvor erarbeiteten Erkentnisse werden im Anschluss in einem empirisch dyna-
mischen Model umgesetzt, um die Wirkung immanenter Restriktionen des Grup-
penwachstums zu demonstrieren. Weiterhin wird bewiesen, dass genossenschaftliche
Organisationen weiterhin als erfolgreich beurteilt werden dürfen, sowohl im popula-
tionsökologischen als auch im sozialen Sinn, auch wenn sie kein Wachstum aufweisen.
Ein weiterentwickelter Ansatz zur Anwendung des Gruppenwachstums als Indikator
für genossenschaftliche Leistung wird als Resultat der Untersuchung vorgeschlagen.
Schlagwörter:
Genossenschaften, Evolutionsökonomie, Populationsökologie, Organizationswachs-
tum, Exit, Voice, Fight, Flight, Rationalität, Memetik
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Part I.
Introduction
1

CHAPTER
ONE
THE ROLE OF CO-OPERATIVES IN AGRICULTURAL
AND FOOD MARKETS
Modern food retail chains demonstrate an ever growing tendency to perform inter-
nationally at the distribution as well as at the acquisition levels. The reduction of
market imperfections such as trade barriers and of transportation costs for goods,
persons, services and information, deliberates purchasers from geographical bounds
and enables them to enjoy many advantages of the market globalization. The con-
stant supply of fruits for instance, has become so obvious to European consumers,
that many of them can't tell anymore when the strawberry season actually is. Ger-
man consumers are not even surprised anymore to ﬁnd strawberries on the super-
market shelves in the middle of February. Trade between diﬀerent climate zones and
even hemispheres makes this possible. But not only the luxury of summer fruits in
the middle of the winter is made possible by trans-regional supply systems. Also
a higher level of supply security of basic nutrition is guaranteed thanks to the ge-
ographical distribution of risks, and the quick availability of alternative sources of
commodities in case of a regional supply crisis.
Growing buyer power in emerging markets encourages retailers, just like produc-
ers, to enter these regions and cut a slice of the growing prosperity in these lands.
However, the geographic expansion of the operation regions also makes it possible
- but at the same time necessary - for retailers to integrate variable sources from
variable locations to secure their supplies. Three crucial aspects are to be accounted
for in the context of international food retail: the ﬁrst is the quantity, the second is
the quality and the third is the price of the delivered products.
Large quantities are the most obvious direct result of expanding market activities.
In order to operate internationally and rotate large stocks, highly developed logistics
are necessary. Modern retailer chains are operating large-scale logistic centers, ac-
cumulating large deliveries and distributing over long distances to the chain-stores.
For this purpose retailers are increasingly seeking for and depending on suppliers,
who can provide them with large quantities of products. Moreover, large scale lo-
gistics make it diﬃcult to control the quality of the products delivered. The main
quality control and assurance activities conducted by big chains do not take place
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along the logistic chain anymore nor at the time of purchase, but is rather based on
customer response and complaint-management. Consequent quality problems are
often becoming known to the retailer when it is already too late. Grave damages to
retailers' reputation and customer trust are a risk faced by retailers and which must
be minimized. In case of repeating customer complaints over a certain product,
the retailer turns to the supplier, and in case no improvement can be achieved, an
alternative supplier is being sourced for. Securing high - and not less important -
constant quality standards, is increasingly a task, a commitment, a responsibility
and an interest of the supplier. The ﬂexibility and variability that are retained
to purchasers through the possibilities opened by trans-regional and international
sourcing, also make it easier for them to seek for the best opportunities on the mar-
kets. Suppliers are therefore forced to secure quantity and quality of deliveries and
at the same time are exposed to high bargaining pressure of the purchasers.
As production location loses its signiﬁcance to high quality standardization, low
prices and aggregated supply of large quantities, agricultural commodities producers
are forced to comply to these new demands. They do not possess bargaining power
resulting from regional dependency of purchasers on their supply anymore. In order
to be able to keep up with the new demands and compete with (sometimes geograph-
ically distant) alternative suppliers of similar products, growers are nowadays forced
to ﬁnd solutions for delivering large aggregated quantities of highly standardized
quality products at competitive prices. Concentrating supply structures seems to
be unavoidable under these conditions. However, in spite of the increasing industri-
alization of agricultural production, individual farmers are still far away from being
able to satisfy the demands of food markets. The aggregated quantity demanded
buy the typical retail chain is far beyond the dimensions of production of the typical
agricultural farm. Now, like in the past, producers need to choose between either
selling their product to merchants who aggregate the quantities delivered by many
farms, or create their own marketing institutions.
The production of agricultural commodities is inherently bound to land. In the
case of animal husbandry, for instance, it is the need to provide the stock with
roughage, a factor which is hardly tradable and hence needs to be produced on
the same farm, which determines a certain spatial distribution of agricultural pro-
duction. Agricultural commodities are also specially characterized as bulky and
perishable, which restricts their geographical mobility and implies high transporta-
tion costs, a feature which implies the creation of spatial markets. On the buyers
side, both processors and producers are highly specialized. A given farm prod-
uct can usually not be substituted by other inputs, nor can it substitute another
one. High specialization on the production as well as on the processing level and
high sunk costs implying high exit barriers for farmers and an inelastic supply
[Rogers & Sexton, 1994], bound farmers to handlers and limit their choice of pur-
chasers for their products. In case of losing access to a certain ﬁrst-handler, farmers
are forced to seek for alternative - sometimes distant - purchasers, which reduces
the value of their product. These characteristics lead to spatial markets and buyer
market power at the ﬁrst-handler level.
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Due to the danger of exploitation by large scale handlers, there seems to be no
other alternative for the individual grower than to join forces and cooperate with
other growers. Co-operative enterprises are perhaps the most intuitive answer for
growers facing changing modern food markets. In order to countervail oligopsony
power in agricultural markets, agricultural producers incorporate into co-operatives,
facilitating the marketing and/or processing of their product, in which they can also
inﬂuence the price they receive. Private agricultural product traders are thus forced
to adapt their prices to the competition delivered by co-operatives. Hence, the
existence of co-operatives in mixed markets inﬂuence the price level in the whole
market, and by that, prevents it from falling too low. The notion that a co-operative
may have a salutary eﬀect on its rivals' pricing behavior is known as the yardstick
of competition [Sexton, 1986a, Sexton, 1990] hypothesis. However, it immediately
becomes obvious, that this market-regulation eﬀect is an open resource, as not only
members of the co-operative, but also the rest of producers on the market, beneﬁt
from this regulation eﬀect. Moreover, as private actors set their trade conditions to
compete with a present co-operative, opportunity costs are being created also for co-
operative members. In such cases, where both co-operative and IOF alternatives are
available on the market, the choice of the farmer for membership in the co-operative
is not granted. In a market environment in which other actors are present, i.e. at
any case in which the co-operative does not possess a monopolistic position in its
market, member traﬃc into and out of the co-operative is to be expected. While
the size of a (local) monopolist co-operative is limited by the size of the population
of potential (local) members present in the market, in case of competition, the size
of the membership is due to reach a state of dynamic balance at a level lower than
the size of the population, while membership traﬃc is expected to persist. Part IV
of this book features a model based on the assumption of existence of alternative
marketing institutions besides co-operation on the market. That model features
the detailed formulation of the mechanisms determining member traﬃc, and the
resulting determination of the co-operative group size.
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CHAPTER
TWO
ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF
CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
Co-operatives are not supposed to generate proﬁts. Their actual purpose is to
transfer their revenues to their members. How can the economic performance of an
organization, which does not generate proﬁts, be assessed?
The co-operative is not a non-proﬁt organization per se, since its purpose is indeed
to generate value. The main diﬀerence to other organization forms lies in the notion
that proﬁts are not generated within and for the co-operative enterprise itself, but
are rather generated by and for the member enterprises. Since it is very diﬃcult to
gain access into the balance sheets of all member enterprises in order to accumulate
the total co-operative performance, it is not an easy task to quantify the value
generated by the co-operative. An indirect way to assess the value generated by the
co-operative is therefore necessary in order to bypass the diﬃculties rising from its
direct measurement.
The notion leading this work is that the co-operative is constantly being mea-
sured and assessed by its own members. According to the result of this assessment,
conducted by each member, the members express their judgment through their be-
havior. Only members who observe a positive total utility from membership become
or remain members of the organization. In that sense they actually vote by their
feet. This characteristic of the co-operative organization is probably one of the main
sources for biases in the results of empirical investigations of co-operative members'
satisfaction.
Surveys, conducted on co-operative membership, include only subjects who are
members of the organization at the time of the probe. Unsurprisingly, such surveys
typically report a generally high level of satisfaction among the members. Unsurpris-
ing it is, and that is perhaps the most important assumption underlying this work,
because those subjects who are not satisﬁed with the co-operative performance are
not members of the organization. And all the members of the co-operative are
therefore  by deﬁnition  satisﬁed with its performance at the time of the survey,
otherwise they just would not be members. One could argue, that satisfaction is
relative to a reference state, that is, the members could be better situated if the
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co-operative would perform better in a certain aspect. But still, even without being
able to name and measure all the diﬀerent kinds of utilities members draw from
co-operation, whether these are intrinsic social or extrinsic material and whatever
the combination of these might be, one thing I can claim with a high level of con-
ﬁdence: The members of a co-operation draw a positive utility from co-operative
membership. Indeed, his utility is relative. The point of reference is the utility that
the members could draw from another alternative activity. That could mean to in-
teract or exchange with another organization, whether of the same kind or another,
or act independently on the free market of opportunities. Therefore, the utility from
membership must be measured as a positive utility additional to the utility of the
alternative.
In order to create a concept for assessing the performance of co-operative orga-
nizations, which would incorporate the intra-organizational as well as the market-
system performance of the organization, this work features an attempt to imply an
evolutionary theoretical perspective, measuring co-operative performance by using
population ecological tools. Assuming:
 Rationality of co-operation
 Competition: Existence of alternatives on the market and
 Implying an evolutionary perspective,
the co-operative organization and it's performance can be assessed in terms of evolu-
tionary ﬁtness. The evolutionary perspective on organizational performance implies
the deﬁnition of populations and environments at each level of observation. Deviat-
ing from the classical population ecological perspective of organizational economics,
the basic unit of the population, deﬁned in this work, is not the organization. Nei-
ther it is the life cycle of the organization which is the basic process yielding the
outcome of the species' ﬁtness. In this book, the co-operative organization serves
as the analogy to the environment of activity for the members, who in turn, feature
the basic unit of the population. The members, however, are not considered to
multiply or perish in their environment, much more it is they who select the envi-
ronment in which to be active, according to their individual interests, capabilities
and the performance of the environment itself, in satisfying the members' interests
and corresponding to their capabilities.
Taking on an evolutionary path of thought, it is unavoidable to refer to the mile-
stone works of Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter. The assessment of evolu-
tionary ﬁtness of organizations has been coined in Nelson and Winter's work An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change [Nelson & Winter, 1982]. The logical
structure at the base of their model [Nelson & Winter, 1982] could be constructed
in the following scheme:
i If in time interval (t, t + n), enterprises that innovate exist along with such
that do not, then the enterprises that innovate generate higher proﬁts than
those that do not.
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ii If the proﬁt of certain enterprises in a time interval (t, t + n) are higher than
the proﬁts of others, then the enterprises which generate the higher proﬁts
increase their capitalization.
iii The enterprises with the higher capitalization have the lower probability of
exit than the enterprises with lower capitalization.
iv If the exit probability of the enterprises with higher capitalization is lower
than that of enterprises with lower capitalization, then in the long run, if the
interval (t, t+n) is long enough, only the enterprises with higher capitalization
will exist in the market.
v Conclusion: If there are enterprises existing, which innovate in time interval
(t, t+ n) and such enterprises that do not, then after a time interval (t, t+ n)
long enough, only the innovating enterprises would exist at the end of the
interval.
If claims (i)-(iv) are true, then claim (v) must logically also be true. As later
referred to by Nelson and Winter themselves [Nelson & Winter, 2002] and by Witt
[Witt, 1987], Friedman1 suggested that the (economic) natural selection argument
is based on proﬁt induced growth. Let us now engage Friedman's element of orga-
nizational expansion into the logical scheme constructed above. It implies that:
1. Innovative enterprises increase their capitalization.
2. Capitalization increase implies organizational expansion.
However, it has already been recognized by economists, that:
3. Organizational expansion retards the innovation rate (i.e. a decrease in relative
research and development expenses)2.
4. Retarded innovation enforces a retarded increase in capitalization.
5. Over the period of time (t, t+n) long enough, innovation and expansion reach
a static balance (An optimal innovation rate is being determined).
We can see, therefore, that confronting the apparently dynamic model of Nelson
and Winter with other known notions of innovation, leads the system to a static equi-
librium. The (originally unwanted) state of equilibrium resulting from the construct
of the model by Nelson and Winter [Nelson & Winter, 1982], after its confronta-
tion with innovation theories, lies in the organizations population perspective of the
model.
1For Friedman's concept refer to [Friedman, 1953], p. 22, and to its references in
[Nelson & Winter, 2002], p. 27, and in [Witt, 1987], p. 78
2Retarded innovation being induced by increasing inertia, longer decision processes as well as
slower adaptation capability.
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Although at the organizational population's level, an expected state of stagnation
should cause worries for the equilibrium aversive economic evolution theorist, this
source of worries is eliminated if the theorist keeps the constituent parts of the
organization itself in mind. As argued in chapter 7 later in this book, the notion of
the organization as the selected entity is due to ignore the individuals constructing
the organization itself. Only a concept that bears regard to the processes within the
apparently static organization, would succeed to describe the dynamic prevailing
within the system.
In order to target this weakness of typical evolutionary approaches to economic
issues, this work attempts to suggest a concept which would also consider the basic
 atomic  particles constructing the socio-economic system; the individual interac-
tors. People, and their behavior.
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CHAPTER
THREE
THE CONCEPT OF INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN
THIS WORK
The object of investigation of the present work is the economic and social phe-
nomenon named co-operative organization. In order to deﬁne the co-operative, as
the subject of this analytical investigation, it would be appropriate to consider the
way co-operatives view themselves by examining the principles that lie at the basis
of these organizations. The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) [ICA, 2009]
deﬁnes the co-operative as an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily
to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through
a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise [ICA, 2009]. This deﬁni-
tion is a sum-up of the co-operative principles and the premises under which the
co-operative organization needs to perform. The ﬁrst feature of the co-operative,
named by this deﬁnition, is the feature of autonomy. As an autonomous, meaning
a self governing entity, the co-operative as an organization enjoys the freedom to
choose its own way and carries the responsibility for its decisions and their conse-
quences. The organization sets its aims and targets and executes the measures to
achieve those.
As an association of persons, the co-operative is deﬁned as a group, also in the
social and socio psychological sense of the word. Being a voluntary union of persons,
acting as a bona ﬁde group, the organization features and maintains a distinctive
group identity and well deﬁned boundaries [Oetzel & Robbins, 2003]. At the same
time, distinctive boundaries are an essential element for creating a group identity.
In order to create perceived inﬂuence of the individual on the group's culture and
on group decisions under a democratic set-up, the group must maintain limited -
easy to grasp - dimensions. These boundaries become harder for the organization
to realize and for the member to perceive, the bigger the group gets. Deﬁned group
boundaries, together with the group culture, provide the additional value which cre-
ates, alongside with the economical value, the necessary compensation and therefore
the necessary condition for group participation of the individual member.
A prerequisite for a scientiﬁcally valuable recognition is an understanding of the
common, the replicable and the repeated. The scientist seeks to understand the
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common, the ordinary so as to be able to appreciate and understand that rare, ex-
traordinary event [Freeman, 1995]. The aim of the present work is to suggest an al-
ternative broader perspective for the assessment of cooperative organizations, which
incorporates the diﬀerent interests and interest conﬂicts of the individual members.
The end of this quest should deliver an instrument, which would save the need to
survey for these interests and conﬂicts and the combination between them for the
individual case, and enable their measurement through observation of the organiza-
tion's behavior from an external perspective. The performance and the quality of
the co-operative, although determined by the judgment of the individual member,
should therefore be expressed as an attribute of the whole organization.
To make that possible, a deeper understanding of the phenomenon called the co-
operative group, its dynamics and the diﬀerent forces acting within and upon it, is
indispensable. This work will attempt to contribute to this holistic understanding.
The thesis at the base of this work is the claim that the performance of the cooper-
ative organization is just as good as the entirety of its members wish it to be. The
assessment of the organization's performance is being conducted by all its members
continuously and simultaneously. According to their assessment of the organization,
the members express their judgment by voting with their feet; given that there is an
alternative to membership existing, members can choose to join or exit the group
according to their personal preferences, costs and utilities.
Based upon this understanding, it should be possible to evaluate the quality of
the organization through observation of the behavior of the entirety of the members.
The dynamic traﬃc of members into and out of the organization should provide
an indicator for its performance as it is being evaluated by its  potential and
present  members. For the purpose of this evaluation, a multi-level viewing of the
cooperative organization is being designed and implemented. The following three
levels of observation, and moreover, the boundary between them, is to a great extent
arbitrary and should mainly serve for the constructed analysis. The deﬁned levels
are:
- The individual: The basic element constructing the organization is the individ-
ual member. This work will investigate members' interests and motivations,
the satisfaction and fulﬁllment of these interests, and the dependency of their
satisfaction on the structure of the organization. The results of this investiga-
tion will enable the model formulation of members' preferences and evolving
choices considering their membership (Exit/Voice/Acquiesce).
- The organization: The analysis on the organization's level will embrace the
inﬂuence of members' behavior on the structure of their organization (growth
model). The organization, for that purpose, is being observed as the popu-
lation of the entirety of its members, and an evolutionary rationale is being
implied.
- The environment: The absolute performance of the organization is being
set in its relation to its market environment and the dynamic organization-
environment-individual behavior interrelations and inﬂuences are analyzed.
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The evolutionary role of the co-operative, as an instrument to create com-
petition advantage, and its role as a possible socio-economic elevator for its
members in its market environment, are demonstrated on this level as well.
As obviously can be seen, these three mentioned levels of observation are hard to
separate from each other. Consequently, the analysis is due to concentrate also on
the dynamic relations and inﬂuences between the processes happening at the overlap
between these dimensions. To be considered is the resulting relationship triangle and
the conjunction areas emerging between these levels:
 Individual  Organization
 Organization  Environment
 Environment  Individual
The focus of examination on the individual agent's level is the rationality of the
exit-voice-acquiesce decision and its evolutionary rationale. For that purpose, a
rather abstract deﬁnition of innovation as any change in pattern of action or behavior
is chosen for this work. Following this notion, any abandoning of one pattern for
another is by deﬁnition an innovation in the evolutionary sense1. This work will try
to sample few of the mechanisms determining the individual's interests, motivations
and decisions. The complex of these interests, motivations and resulting decisions is
the actual force driving or inhibiting, and the actual source or barrier of innovation
in the sense of acting diﬀerently.
After handling strategic decision making on the individual's level, the focus of
analysis in this work will turn to the next level, the organizational level, where the
dynamic relations triangle  organization structure, member traﬃc and environment
 actually comes into expression. The connection between the size of the organi-
zation, the members' preferences and resulting membership choices, and the way
these interact with the organizational environment, and inﬂuence each other in a
reciprocative manner, are all demonstrated at this level of observation.
In order to establish the foundation for this notion, a review of the logic of the
economical evolution concept, in the light of recently achieved insights into biological
evolution, genetics and epigenetics, is being conducted in part III of this work. Part
IV features the integration of these recognitions and their implementation into an
empirical theoretic model.
1The notion of acting diﬀerently (translated from German: anders handeln, O.L.) has been
comprehensively discussed by Axel Freier in [Freier, 2007], p. 47.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
THE RATIONALITY OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR
In contradiction to some traditional theories of groups, empirical researches have
shown that the human being does not feature a natural tendency to belong to big
organizations and groups. Much more it is a rational - if not an opportunistic -
choice of the individual to belong to a collective group. In his book The Logic of
Collective Action [Olson, 1965], Mancur Olson Jr. has stated the purpose of any
group or organization as to act for some collective advantage, which must beneﬁt all
members of the certain group. Although all members of the group have a common
interest to achieve this advantage, they do not have a common interest to carry
the costs of this achievement. Each member would prefer to let the other members
carry the full costs of achieving the group's purpose and enjoy the beneﬁts of the
collective action, whether he or she has taken a share in achieving them or not.
According to this logic, it is plausible to observe the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the group as an exchange relationship; the individual member contributes
a share of the eﬀort involved in the group's action which determines his costs for
membership. In exchange, the member receives a share of the group's achievement
which is the product that the group supplies to the individual member. Each indi-
vidual in the group determines a diﬀerent value for group's product and expects this
value to be higher than his or her share on the costs, as a condition for being (or
remaining) a member. As demonstrated by Olson [Olson, 1965], the total costs of
the collective action would rise over-proportionally as a function of the production
quantity, just like the costs of any other - non collective - product. Establishing
the formal organization and installing the production system for the product (which
might just as well be a certain service) would cause high start-up and ﬁx costs. The
ﬁrst unit of production would therefore be over proportionally expensive. Due to
mass-production the price for the single unit of production decreases. This decrease
in the cost becomes ever smaller as the quantity is increased, until it reaches a cer-
tain minimum. Up from this certain critical quantity of the collective production,
the price of the single unit of the collective product is increasing. Assuming that
the production quantity of the group must be increased when the group expands,
it is therefore inevitable that the share of production costs of one of the members
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exceeds his or her value for the group's product at some point.
From the perspective of the single member, an expansion of the group means
therefore a decrease in the quality or beneﬁt of the collective product. That is
exactly the case which Albert O. Hirschman addresses in his work Exit, Voice and
Loyalty [Hirschman, 1970]. According to Hirschman, the options of exit or voice
are substitutive choices of the agent (who may be a customer acquiring the product
or services of a ﬁrm, or a member of a political party, who chooses to support its
ideology or vote for an alternative competing party) in reaction to a decline in the
quality of the product, service or ideology oﬀered to him by his supplier. Adapting
Hirschman's concept to our case of co-operating groups, we consider the member
to be facing a situation, in which he or she needs to decide between either giving
up the group membership for the sake of an alternative source (exit), or raising
his or her voice in protest (voice) in order to prevent the decline of its value.
Hirschman has observed the costs of exit as a barrier, which would prevent the
member from abandoning the organization and motivate him or her to choose the
option of voice. Low exit costs on the other hand would increase the tendency of
the customer to abandon the organization without raising protests, which would not
give the organization an inducement to improve or correct its weakness1.
However, as Zhu, Hendrikse and Krug demonstrate in their work Relational En-
trepreneurship in Local China [Zhu et al., 2006], exit and voice can perform com-
plementary. Agents who possess low exit costs and therefore a well available option
to abandon their contracting party, possess more bargaining power, their threat to
abandon is more credible, and are therefore more likely to have a stronger inﬂuence
on their counterpart. They are therefore more likely to choose the option of voice,
since they have better chances for increasing the quality of the product supplied to
them, and that for lower costs than the option to exit would involve.
In the situation that the group-member is facing, as the value of the membership
decreases, the reaction options of exit and voice are complementary as well. The
member has the option to attempt blocking the entrance of a new member, or
abandon the group immediately. However, this decision between exit and voice is
inﬂuenced by the costs and the probability of inﬂuencing the group, which are in
turn a function of the size of the group. Hence, as demonstrated later in this work,
the growth of the group is stimulating the frequency of abandoning the group within
the population of members, retarding in turn the growth itself.
1For the signiﬁcance of voice for the organizational management refer to p. 37 in
[Hirschman, 1970].
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CHAPTER
FIVE
THE INTEREST OF THE GROUP TO KEEP GROWING
Groups are diﬀerent in their tendency and interest to grow. Some special types of
groups, like football clubs, religious communities, clubs of common interest such as
motorcycle clubs and so on, gain their recognition and prestige, and their members
gain their conﬁrmation, merely through their ability to attract as many members
as possible and demonstrate constant growth. In football clubs, for instance, there
is probably no other measure for their success other than the number of registered
members. Religious streams receive the conﬁrmation of their doctrines through the
acceptance of those by new followers. That is, however, not necessarily the case for
any group. Especially, but not only, members of common material interest groups
tend to feature a tendency for exclusivity. However, even religious groups very often
determine high entrance barriers for their membership. In some cases entrance
may be acquired only after going through a long examination procedure. In other,
more extreme cases, entrance into the community is only made possible by birth
or marriage. A typical example is provided in the work of Egbert [Egbert, 1998]
concerning a Muslim ethnic-religious group in east Africa.
However, that does not necessitates that the group must consist of a small cultural
religious and ethnic isolated community in order to exclude itself from non-members.
Every state formulates a list of conditions which must be fulﬁlled by a person in order
to receive its citizenship. So at the bottom line, every group attempts to provide the
advantage or utility it creates exclusively to its members and deny access to others.
Those who are not members are excluded from the beneﬁts created by the group,
whereas the threat of exclusion is being utilized as a measure of pressure on existing
members to accept the rules of the group [Egbert, 1998].
Furthermore, the group must feature perceivable borders in order to ensure the
perception of the advantage of being a member. Without being able to identify
the borders of the group and the positive diﬀerence between being and not being
a member, the individual has no incentive, neither intrinsic nor extrinsic to be
part of the group, and the group loses its value. From this point of view, the
group itself should not be expected to feature a strong tendency to inﬁnitely keep
growing. However, the group we characterize is an established enterprise of a certain
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signiﬁcant size, featuring a management organ, which might have the interest to
expand its activity, at least for the sake of its professional or personal satisfaction or
prestige. Our basic assumption is that the management does not have the interest
to lose members or, in other words, to reduce the size of the group constructing the
organization. Nevertheless, as argued in chapter 22 further in this book, a stagnation
in the process of growth occurs whenever one member of the group objects to the
growth continuance. Once this situation occurs, it is out of the inﬂuence of the
management to prevent it. Much more, the management needs to decide between
choosing to satisfy and keep the old member, or to lose this member and accept the
new membership candidate. Keeping the old member would most certainly ensure a
further stagnation in the growth of the group, which might not be the interest of the
management. On the other hand, losing the old member for the sake of accepting
the new one is also involved with a certain risk, as the new member and her or his
performance are not yet known. This risk must also be considered as a cost for the
group.
To sum it all up, the interest of the group to keep growing must be considered as
a private case. Each group would feature a speciﬁc interest to grow, which can only
be expressed as a demand curve for growth. Each group would feature a diﬀerent
price elasticity for growth and would be ready to pay a diﬀerent price for a certain
marginal growth. Moreover, there is no general rule for which member, the existing
or the future candidate, the group should prefer in order to achieve its growth target
value. Each group would create a private case. For the purpose of this work we as-
sume the group as an indiﬀerent organization i.e. the organization has no signiﬁcant
preference between the new and the already existing member. However, convincing
the group to prefer the already existing member over the future candidate is as-
sumed to involved certain costs, proportional to the number of members who need
to be reached through communication. This assumption plays a signiﬁcant role in
the construct of prices of exit or voice determining the opportunistic preferences of
the protesting member, as illustrated in detail in chapter 21. That opportunistic
behavior of the individual member is therefore the only factor inﬂuencing the char-
acteristic growth, formulated in the model construct, presented in chapter 22 of this
work.
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CHAPTER
SIX
THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF COOPERATIVE
ORGANIZATIONS AS AN ADAPTATION PROCESS
A necessary characteristic of an organization, whether human or non-human, to
ensure its performance and viability, is its ability to adapt itself to its dynamic
environment or to diﬀerent environments. Adaptation can take numerous forms on
diﬀerent levels. On the operational level, an organization might adapt its capabilities
by gaining knowledge or experience, or by changing its equipment or processes. On
the strategic level, an organization can adapt as a strategic response to its changing
environment by adapting its design, by changing its size or its structure, or it can
do these in combination with shifting to another environment1 in order to secure its
advantage and its survival.
Organizations are related to as a collection of agents when considering their adap-
tation at the operational level. Adaptation at the strategic level is being observed
as decisions from above, which are being applied and enforced by principals and
executed (or not) by agents. This view of organizations can fairly well be applied
to organizations with distinctive hierarchies and principal-agent roles. In such an
organization there is a central organ, the CEO or a central unit, which directs adap-
tations processes in the means of certain changes in the organization's design. This
central unit controls the set of agents which form the organization, the way this set
of agents is structured, the distribution of knowledge, information and tasks between
these agents and the connections between them. Over time the central unit or CEO
of a hierarchic organization attempts to optimize the design of the organization by
taking steps of change which they suppose would move the organization closer to a
given set of goals they previously deﬁne. The purpose of these steps of changes is
to achieve an optimal state2. However, many kinds of cooperating groups, whether
of humans or non-humans, lack this distinctive hierarchy feature. At least in some
aspects of the organizational design, every member of such a group is at the same
time a principal and an agent at their own sake.
1An environment in the economical sense could be a market, a product, a branch or even a
geographical location or a political system.
2Corresponding to the predeﬁned set of goals.
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The distinctive feature of the co-operative organization is that it belongs to its
own members. That means that the organization is a collection  a group  of
the agents whom it is supposed to serve. Whether the organization is successful
in serving the member's purpose or not, has the direct consequence of the agent's
being a member or not. In other words, the fact that the individual agent is a
member of the organization is a result, and at the same time an indicator, that the
organization is serving its purpose. If the individual member sees an advantage in
being, over not being a member, the organization is successful in serving its purpose;
otherwise the member would have exited that organization. Therefore, there is not
much room for the discussion of the question whether a co-operative is successful or
not, it's mere existence is the only necessary proof for its success, at least as much
as it might concern its members. But the inﬂuence of the individual members on
their organization does not end at this point. Much more, the agents determine the
design of their organization by their own decisions and actions.
One of the aspects in which the members of a group shape the organization, is
the size of the organization in the sense of the number of its members3. A central
unit or a CEO of a hierarchic structured organization might attempt to direct the
adaptation process of the organization to what they consider to be its optimal size
under a given set of environmental conditions. But for open membership groups (like
co-operatives), where the members are free to join or leave voluntarily, the optimum
of the membership size is being determined quite diﬀerently. When it comes to
determining the number of agents acting within the group, the agents themselves
determine the optimal state. The optimal size of the organization is deﬁned by
each of the members. The organization may therefore be considered as being at a
state of dynamic balance. Any change in the environment of the organization causes
a movement of agents into or out of the organization and therefore an immediate
adaptation of the organization to the new conditions.
In a co-operative group, the state of dynamic balance is being adjusted from
within the organization more than from an external (or central) strategic point
of perspective. Therefore, opposite to the common proposition about hierarchic
organizations, a co-operative group adapts its size by itself, as part of its continuous
operation, and this adaptation is therefore more similar in its characteristics to
adaptation at the operational than at the strategic level.
This feature of the co-operative is signiﬁcant for the understanding of the unique
limitations in implementation of organizational adaptation strategies. Both the
market power [Porter, 1980] and the resource-based [Wernerfelt, 1984] approaches
to business strategy, relate to the single ﬁrm as the adapting unit. Accordingly, both
of these perspectives take for granted the ability of managers to control what ﬁrms
are doing and how [Freeman, 1995]. What is the signiﬁcance of the level and locus
of control for the formulation of approaches of strategic management? As formu-
lated by John Freeman [Freeman, 1995], the answer is simpleif the people making
strategies are not also in control of the organization, then strategies will often re-
3In distinction from its economic size.
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main unimplemented; and unimplemented strategies are irrelevant4. In that sense,
in order to determine which and whose strategies are relevant, we must ﬁrst ﬁnd
out who is in control of which feature of the organization. This is especially ap-
plicable to the strategic determination of organizational size, when applied to the
co-operative organization. If we ought to develop a strategic tool for the determina-
tion of the optimal size for the organization of the type co-operative, it is crucial to
ﬁrst understand where and by whom the size of organizations of that type is being
strategically determined.
4Refer to page 219 in [Freeman, 1995]
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CHAPTER
SEVEN
INTRODUCTION TO PART III
The last two decades have witnessed a renaissance of evolutionary thinking in so-
cial sciences in general and in economic sciences in particular. The main eﬀort of
scholars exploring evolutionary economics is still aimed at trying to recognize the
potential explanatory powers of evolutionary approaches to economics, highlighting
the gaps in economical research that may be closed by evolutionary paradigm and
exploring the limits of the evolutionary logic in understanding economics as a human
phenomenon. A lot of contemporary works are still occupied with deﬁning evolu-
tionary theory itself and its criteria. Attempts to imply the evolutionary paradigm
as an alternative to traditional economic approaches to speciﬁc social questions
and problems are still very rare. Before I turn to such an attempt of implying evo-
lutionary approaches to explaining a speciﬁc phenomenon in part IV of this book
(in this case the forces and mechanisms determining the growth of human groupings
in general and co-operative groups in particular), in this chapter I will ﬁrst attempt
to deliver a partial insight into evolutionary theory and its economic and historical
development. Based on my undoubtfully limited insight into this discipline I shall
attempt to suggest some adaptations to the evolutionary approach, which might
be necessary contributions to the implementability of the theoretical construct to
speciﬁc economic practical issues.
27
Introduction to part III
28
CHAPTER
EIGHT
DARWIN IN THE ECONOMICS SCHOOL
In biology, and closely followed by economics, Darwinism has been the established
synonym for evolution in the last 150 years. According to Darwin's theory, evolu-
tionary change occurs as a result of variety generation, natural selection and trans-
mission of characteristics, enabling the well known notion of the survival of the
ﬁttest1. The main principles of Darwin's theory are based on the notion, that each
population of a given species reproduces more oﬀspring than the environment can
support. This leads to competition between members of the population (interac-
tors), in addition to the competition with other species. According to the Darwinist
concept, many of the oﬀspring population are due to perish, only the ﬁttest survive.
The survival of interactors or their longer life expectancy would mean an increase
of their chances to set oﬀspring, transmitting characteristics similar to their ances-
tors' to the next generations. In a given environmental set up2, this oﬀspring would
possess the replicators, determining its characteristics securing its evolutionary ad-
vantage over its competitors, increasing its probability of setting oﬀspring and so
forth. Darwin, at his time, had not been provided with scientiﬁc insights into the
mechanisms of heredity and could therefore not provide a detailed explanation for
the way it occurs. Relying only on evidence and theoretical logic, he was certainly
venturous to publish his theory On the Origin of Species in the year 1859, being
aware of the diﬃculties he could not solve and exposing his theory to critics. But
coping with limited informations and the readiness for academic debate is probably
only a partial expression of Darwin's scientiﬁc greatness. It had not been until few
years later, as Gregor Mendel 1865 had published his ﬁndings from experiments in
plant breeding, providing the evidence for heredity through particles, formulating
what was ﬁrst related to as Mendel's Law and known nowadays as Mendel's Rule
of heredity.
1Survival of the ﬁttest is a phrase coined by the philosopher Herbert Spencer, who actually
criticized Darwin's theory from a position of evolutionary understanding more similar to that
of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. I shall discuss Lamarck's theory later in this chapter
2It is not intended to claim here that a given environmental set up can exist. It is actually the
constant dynamic change which drives evolution
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These recognitions not only provided the complementation of Darwin's theory to
neo-Darwinism, but also established the basis for the following genetic science after
1940. Later scientiﬁc recognitions about molecular genetics and their mechanisms
have supported Darwin's concept. Molecular genetics have delivered the explanation
of variety generation through spontaneous mutation, combination and recombina-
tion of DNA molecule sequences. According to Darwinist evolution theory, the
organism itself does not have a direct inﬂuence upon the complex characteristics its
genome possesses or the expression of these characteristics in its phenotype. All mu-
tations take place spontaneously and randomly, and only at the phase of exposure
of this phenotype and its characteristics, abilities, capabilities and weaknesses, it is
being selected according to its inherited ﬁtness.
Although the inﬂuence of the organism on its environment is considered in the
context of ecology and populations ecology, the environment itself is still considered
as exogenous conditions for selection. The inﬂuence of the organism on the envi-
ronment is indeed part of the factors determining the selecting environment, but no
intended adaptation of the environment is attributed to the organism. Taking for
example the ability of Penicillium fungi to produce toxics and by that reduce threat-
ens from bacteria by inhibiting the formation of peptidoglycan in their cell walls,
no intended elimination of bacteria can be attributed to the mushroom. The ability
to produce these toxic substances is considered to be a characteristic generated by
coincidental mutations, which on their hand secured the evolutionary advantage and
survivability of Penicillium fungi in an environment rich in bacteria.
The attribution of passivity to the organism and the total coincidence of variety
generation are the main internal weaknesses of biological evolution as an analogical
basis for the analysis of social and economical evolution, and are only part of the
elements exposing it and the applicability of neo-Darwinist evolutionary logics to
social sciences to critiques.
Economics and biology have mutually inﬂuenced each other over the centuries
[Hammerstein & Hagen, 2005]. The inspiration of Adam Smith's work on TheWealth
of Nations on Darwin's theory is widely known. Quite soon after the broad accep-
tance and establishment of Darwinist evolution in biological thought in the second
half of the nineteenth century, Darwin's distinctive ideas have been soon drawn back
into social studies. Biological metaphors have always been present in economic the-
ory, and the ideas of competition and struggle in the writing of Smith and Thomas
Robert Malthus simultaneously inspired economics and biology. However, there has
been a strong variation in the popularity and intensity of use of biological metaphors
in social sciences and in economics over the twentieth century.
As Nelson and Winter recognized in their review of evolutionary theorizing in
economics [Nelson & Winter, 2002], after being widespread in economics during the
ﬁrst several decades of the twentieth century, having evolutionary strands and con-
cepts contained in many textbooks and journals of economics prior to World War II,
evolutionary thought seems to have vanished from social sciences in the early post
war period [Nelson & Winter, 2002]. In that review, Nelson and Winter point out
the increasing ﬁxation of neo-classical economic theory on equilibrium conditions,
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and the mathematical formulation of that theory, as the cause for the disappearance
of evolutionary thought from microeconomic theorizing after the war.
But much more than the cause, this has probably only been the symptom. The
decline of biology in social sciences was not the direct cause for the turn of economic
theorists to mechanistic modeling. Stark reliance on mathematics has evidently
taken the space left open by absence of evolutionary perceptions from sociological
and ideological  just as much as economical  thought, as well as politics and, to
an extent, perhaps even emotions, in the early decades of the twentieth century
[Hodgson, 2005]3.
The historical overview of the progress of relationships between biology and eco-
nomics can be divided into three academic-cultural-lingual spaces, as suggested by
Hodgson [Hodgson, 2005]: The German, the British and the American. In all three
zones there have evidently been two distinctive directions of biological paradigm in
social sciences. The one being the use of organic or biological analogies to describe
and explain social and economic phenomena. The second, the explanation of human
behavior as purely biologically conditioned and society itself as an organism.
In the German-speaking world, the notion of the social organism was the sub-
ject of contention in the two decades long dispute known as the Methodenstreit,
opened by Carl Menger in 1883 [Hodgson, 2005]. The core issue of that dispute was
the roles of individual and society and the relationship between them. Extensive
comparisons between biological and social organisms and strong organic metaphor
had been manifest in social sciences during the rise of the German historical school
[Hodgson, 2005]4, attributing features of a growing organism with its own mind and
will to the social system. Karl Menger did not target the use of organic metaphor
in social sciences for itself. Much more he targeted the idea of the social organism,
with its attributes of own purpose and will. But the controversy over the legitimacy
of biological analogues in social sciences lead to skepticism towards the validity and
applicability of biological logics, and consequently, towards biological analogies in
social sciences.
In Britain of the 1870-1920 period, biological reductionism was prominent in social
sciences. The belief that human individual behavior and the resulting social progress
are originated in and determined by human genetic legacy was widely established.
The concept of eugenics has found widespread following in Britain and American
social sciences. The main inﬂuence in the last three decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury was that of Herbert Spencer, who attempted to build a complete system of
thought that would embrace both the natural and social sciences. Inﬂuenced by the
German theorists, Spencer's concept of socio-economic evolution was more similar
in its leading logic to the biological evolutionary theory by Jean Baptiste Lamarck5
rather than to that of Darwin, stressing the organism's adaptation to the environ-
ment rather than the selection of organisms by the environment [Hodgson, 2005]6.
3See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 127
4See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 109
5More to the evolutionary theory of Lamarck in the following section 9 of this work
6See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 111
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However, diﬀerent from the leading organicist notion of social organicism dominant
in the German school, Spencer's concept was deterministic, individualistic, reduc-
tionist and atomist, addressing society in the mechanistic terms, popular in the
Victorian era of the industrial evolution. His concepts had a broad inﬂuence, inspir-
ing inﬂuential economic theorists, among others John Maynard Keynes and Alfred
Marshall.
Marschall's Spencerian biology had fallen out of favor soon after Spencer's death
in 1903. In the light of Darwin's acceptance as the only true biological evolutionary
theory, economic theory inﬂuenced by Spencer's biology has been abandoned by eco-
nomics scholars altogether with biology itself as a source of inspiration. Marshall's
inﬂuential successor Pigou [Pigou, 1928] turned instead to physics for inspiration
and to the notion of the ﬁrm in a state of equilibrium. The concepts developed
under the inﬂuence of Pigou's notion of equilibrium were inconsistent with the ex-
istence of heterogeneous agents. Under the absence of heterogeneity and variety
from mainstream economics, Darwin's biological evolutionary principle of variety
generation and selection could not anymore be utilized for economical analysis.
In USA as in Germany and Britain, organic analogies were widely adopted into
economics, in great extent due to the strong inﬂuence of the German historical school
on American economics [Hodgson, 2005]7. However, a major discrepancy existed be-
tween the streams of pragmatist philosophy and the instinct psychology developed
by William McDaugall [Hodgson, 2005]8, which argued that much of human behav-
ior was dependent upon inherited instincts, assigning biology a main role in shaping
human society on one hand, and the stream of interactionism and anti-reductionism
which, while acknowledging the biotic foundations of social life, resisted the view
that human behavior could be explained purely and simply in terms of genetic inher-
itance [Hodgson, 2005]9. However, Veblen10 embraced Darwinism and proposed that
the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection should be applied to
economics, whereas institutions serve as the units of selection. These notions laid
the ground on which American institutionalism had grown. Both the German his-
torical school and American institutionalism possessed the same limited perspective
of Darwinism as a synonym for biological evolution, leaving theorists no other option
but to either accept biology as the driving force behind individual and social behav-
ior and as the the analogue model for economic evolution, or reject evolution with
its biological connotation altogether. This rejection had been enforced by ideolog-
ical and ethical developments in America during the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth
century. Later on, following the trauma of World War II, Darwinian thinking in
social sciences, including the principles of inherited competencies, competition and
selection, was drawing connotations of early evils and was not anymore politically
correct. It has not been before the seventies until evolution returned to be named
aloud in social and economic research contexts.
7See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 113
8See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 114
9See [Hodgson, 2005], p. 114
10As cited by [Hodgson, 2005], p. 114
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The ﬁrst who actually dared calling the evolutionary stream of thought in eco-
nomics evolutionary economics, were Nelson and Winter in the beginning of the
nineteen seventies [Hammerstein & Hagen, 2005], [Nelson & Winter, 1982],
[Nelson & Winter, 2002], [Witt, 1987]. Their evolutionary economics are inspired by
the early work of Schumpeter [Schumpeter, 1934] on the role of innovation in eco-
nomic change over time. Schumpeter suggested innovation as the major force behind
economic change. According to his theory, innovative technology of a ﬁrm creates
proﬁt until competitors imitate it. The loss of innovative advantage and the proﬁts
it creates motivates the ﬁrm to innovate repeatedly. There is an obvious discrep-
ancy between this dynamic underlying economic evolution and the broadly accepted
neo-Darwinist notion of variety generation through mutation. As mentioned earlier
in this section, biological mutation after Darwin assigns a rather passive role to
the organism. The coincidence of biological innovation remains problematic for
implication in the social sciences as long as Darwinist selection, based on random
mutation, is considered as synonym for biological evolution. This discrepancy forces
the distancing of evolutionary economists from biological analogy, which prevails till
this day [Witt, 2005]. More to that in the following sections.
Although featuring certain diﬀerences in its origins, and although diﬀerent in its
periodical phases in the three cultural spaces mentioned above, the academical and
ideological dispute over the use of biological, genetic and evolutionary terminology
in social sciences featured a common point of focus. The main issue of the debate
has been the inﬂuence of human biology and evolutionary history on the behavior
of individuals and social groups. That actually applies to the methodological dis-
pute, even after evolutionary metaphors gained entrance back into social sciences
and economics in the seventies of the twentieth century. However, this dispute has
been rather ideological than scientiﬁc in its character. Undoubtedly, human behav-
ior is determined to great extent by culture and society. But Although certainly
not determined exclusively by genetics, human behavior and psychology are indeed
inﬂuenced by human biology and instincts. The term Human Nature is indeed a
complex notion. However, perhaps it is not at all necessary to solve the question,
to what extent is human behavior determined by its genes. There might be no
gain for the understanding of the mechanisms of economical development and social
change, if the relative signiﬁcance attributed to nature or nurture in psychology is
determined to the extent of an absolute value. Searching for the mechanism of va-
riety generation ultimately analogue to DNA replication might not be constructive
contribution to the understanding of system and social developments. Much greater
advances could be gained if the biological analogues in economics are abstracted
and separated from their original context. A further investigation of that notion is
conducted in chapter 15 of this work.
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CHAPTER
NINE
EVOLUTION AFTER JEAN-BAPTISTE LAMARCK
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd any paper approaching social and economical evolution with-
out mentioning Lamarck and his evolutionary theory of adaptation mechanisms and
the inheritance of acquired traits. But non of these actually presents neither Jean-
Baptist Lamarck himself nor his evolutionary theory to its details, and analysis its
principles as to explain its rejection from biological evolutionary theory and conse-
quently the dissociation of biological from economical evolution. I shall therefore
start this section with a short summary of Lamarck's life and legacy1.
Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck (17441829) was a
French botanical and zoological scientist. Born as the eleventh child of an impover-
ished aristocrat family he followed the request of his father and enrolled in a Jesuit
college in Amiens in the late 1750's with the aim to become a priest. After the death
of his father in 1760, Lamarck joined the French army, which was engaged in the
Pomeranian war against Prussia at the time. After showing bravery in combat and
being nominated for lieutenancy, Lamarck got injured and posted in Monaco, where
he encountered James Francis Chomel's botany book Traité des plantes usuelles.
In 1766 Lamarck quit the army and attempted to study medicine and botanic in
Paris. Under the persuasion of his elderly brother he gave up his medicine studies
after four years and followed his interest in botany. After publishing a three-volume
work on French ﬂora in 1778, which launched him into prominence in French science
and helped him to a membership in the French Academy of Sciences in 1779 and a
commission as a Royal Botanist in 1781.
Lamarck worked for ﬁve years as keeper of the Royal Herbarium before being
appointed curator and professor of inverberate zoology at the Muséum National
d'Histoire Naturelle in 1793. Before the year 1800, Lamarck was still holding the
position common in that era, that species are constant in their features. Only
through his work on the fossil mullocks of the Paris basin he became convinced that
transmutations or change in the nature of species occurred over time. The variety of
species he became acquainted with and the apparent gradual increase in complexity
of species he observed brought him to his developing idea about evolution. On
1For a comprehensive presentation of Lamarck's life and work refer to [Packard, 1901]
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the 11 May 1800 he ﬁrst presented an outline of his newly developing ideas about
evolution. In 1802 he published Recherches sur l'Organisation des Corps Vivans
in which he presented his theory of evolution. According to Lamarck's perception,
life was organized in a vertical hierarchic chain, with gradation between the lowest
and the highest forms of life, featuring a path of development in nature. In his later
book Phylosophie Zoologique from 1809 he argued that every species was due to
exist in harmony with its environment, and since the environment was in a constant
change, species had to constantly change as well.
Lamarck, who was a materialist in his belief, relied on the recognitions of chemistry
and physics of his time to explain the two basic forces he noted as comprising
evolution:
- The power of life: Organisms tend to progress up a ladder of complexity
and increasing order. Life was believed at Lamarck's time to be constantly 
spontaneously  generated (observed, for instance, as the worms appearing on
rotting waste). Natural movements of ﬂuids in living organisms, according to
Lamarck, drove them toward ever greater levels of complexity.
- The inﬂuence of circumstances: While adapting to their environment, organ-
isms can be driven oﬀ the ladder of complexity progress into specialized form
of local adaptation. The interaction with the environment and the resulting
use or disuse of diﬀerent characteristics was considered by Lamarck as the
power behind the adaptive force of evolution.
Regulated through the intensity of use of their diﬀerent organs, living creatures
lose characteristics which they do not need and develop other characteristics that
they do, strengthening organs that they constantly use. The complementary prin-
ciple of Lamarck's evolution was the inheritance of acquired characteristics: Living
creatures inherit the characteristics they developed (through the use of organs) to
their next generations.
Famous examples used by Lamarck to demonstrate his evolution theory are that
of the giraﬀe's neck and the development of muscles. Through stretching its neck in
order to reach the leaves of the highest trees, the giraﬀe lengthens its neck, developing
a characteristic which it then inherits to its oﬀspring. The iron smith develops his
muscles through his work, and inherits these on to his sons.
Lamarck's theory of evolution was wide-ranging. It included continual sponta-
neous generation of simple forms of life, progressive change caused by the inherent
tendency of living matter to become more complex, modiﬁcations brought about by
the increased use or disuse of organs and parts in response to environmental condi-
tions and the inheritance of such modiﬁcations [Jablonka et al., 1998]. However, in
modern biology, at least until the last decades of the twentieth century which fea-
tured new insights into inheritance mechanisms and the development of epigenetic
theories2, Lamarckism is usually equated with the inheritance of acquired characters.
That applies both to biological as to social sciences.
2For a more detailed review of Epigenetics refer to chapter 11 of this book
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TEN
THE REJECTION OF LAMARCK'S EVOLUTION
FROM BIOLOGY LEADING TO REJECTION OF
BIOLOGY FROM SOCIAL SCIENCES
The central dogma of molecular biology relies on the theory of the biologist August
Weismann, who formulated the idea of the so called Weismann Barrier during the
1890s. According to Weismann, the hereditary material passed from parents to
oﬀspring (germ-plasm) remained separated from the material composing the body
of the organism (soma). Thus, sequence information is prevented from ﬂowing from
proteins to nucleic acids. That implies that genetic information can only ﬂow in
only one direction:
DNA > RNA > Protein
Following this concept, molecular genetics have completed the chemical explana-
tion for Darwinian heredity. Darwin's evolution, based on spontaneous mutations
(creating variety) and environmental selection, has become the synonym for evolu-
tion in biology and  consequently  the point of reference for evolution in social
sciences and economics. Keeping Spencerian concepts of social evolution aside1, so-
cial evolution theorists generally refer to an apparent biological evolution based on
Darwinian mutation and selection, and therefore demonstrate an obvious restraint
from the direct applicability of what they perceive to be the biological evolution into
social and economic evolution.
The modern strand of evolutionary thought in economics is inspired by the early
work of Schumpeter [Schumpeter, 1934] on the role of innovation in economic change
over time [Hammerstein & Hagen, 2005]. The economic evolutionary element of
variation generation through innovation is not analogue to the biological mutation
in the sense that organisms do not conduct research and development activities,
and do not decide about their next strategy of changing. Moreover, ontogenetic
in biology refers to the regular systematic unfolding of the individual organism,
subject to environmental conditions but determined by the individual's genetic pro-
1For a detailed overview of Darwin's and Lamarck's positioning in social evolution theory refer
to [Hodgson, 2001]
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gram [Witt, 2005]. Obviously, as recognized by Witt, organizational or institutional
changes, the subjects of economic evolution, are not driven by the same causation
common within species in nature such as the expression of a genetic program, related
to change in Darwinian biology.
A great portion of the diﬃculties in creating an economic evolution theory, featur-
ing elements isomorph to biological evolution, originate in the fact that economists
are obviously not familiar with resent recognitions achieved in the ﬁeld of biological
sciences. Modern biology turns to feature much more mechanisms of Lamarck-
ian evolution than economists seem to be aware of. Examples for the (obsolete)
biological evolution paradigm of economical evolutionists can be found in the for-
mulations of Witt [Witt, 1987, Witt, 2005], Foster [Foster, 2005], Nelson and Win-
ter [Nelson & Winter, 1982, Nelson & Winter, 2002] and practically anybody who
writes anything on the subject of economic evolution. Taking another look at resent
developments in biologists' understandings about change and inheritance processes
in nature, might save economic and social evolution scientists a great deal of trouble.
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ELEVEN
NEW EVIDENCES FROM BIOLOGY AND THE
EPIGENETIC EXPLANATORY MECHANISMS
Although in the last years, thousands of articles, numerous scientiﬁc meetings and
a new journal were devoted to the subject of epigenetics [Bird, 2007], the term and
the idea seem not to have reached the conscience of evolution economists. It is
perhaps time for economists to take notice of this new understanding of natural
phenotypical and genetical change. It is not, however, the aim of this book, nor it is
my pretension to be able to deliver a complete review of the science of epigenetics.
Much more it is my wish to turn the reader's awareness to resent achievements in
the biological explanation of trans generation inheritance. These new recognitions
of biology suggest that biological evolution might be much more Lamarckian than
the socio-economist might think.
The term epigenetics, which translates as in addition to genetics stands to de-
scribe and explain mechanisms of changes in phenotypes, which do not originate
in changes in the underlying DNA sequence. It therefore excludes the inheritance
of mutational changes. Nevertheless, such epigenetical changes may withstand cell
divisions for the remainder of the cell's life and even last for multiple generations.
Examples of trans generational epigenetics are now well documented in plants
and fungi. Data on epigenetical inheritance mechanisms by animals are still scarce.
However, their potential to shift our understanding of inheritance, from geneti-
cal determinism to the Lamarckian antidote of the possibility that acquired marks
can be passed over to following generations, has sparked the general imagination
[Bird, 2007]. The signiﬁcant recognition of epigenetics is that the experiences of an
organism at one generation, the air it breathed, the food it ate, even the things it
saw, have a potential direct inﬂuence on the life of its oﬀspring, even decades after,
although the oﬀspring might never be exposed to the same experiences.
At the molecular level, the post synthetic modiﬁcation of gene expression are
occurring without alteration of the DNA itself. Several known inheritance mech-
anisms may play a role in epigenetical cell memory [Jablonka et al., 1998]. The
broadly accepted mechanism, suggested as an explanation for the chemical modiﬁ-
cation of DNA, which can be inherited and subsequently removed without changing
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the original DNA code, is the activity and inﬂuence of the so called chemical marks.
Eucaryotic cells' genome carries diﬀerent chemical marks which are added to either
DNA or chromatin proteins [Suzuki & Bird, 2008]. This epigenetic information is
regionally variable and signals or preserves local activity states, such as gene tran-
scription or silencing. The sum of these information in the genome is the epigenome.
Unlike the genome, the epigenome is highly variable between cells and ﬂuctuates over
the time span of cell's life according to conditions even within a single cell. There are
therefore at least as many epigenomes as there are cell types [Suzuki & Bird, 2008].
One large-scaled distributed epigenetic mark in normal tissues and cell types is
the DNA methylation [Suzuki & Bird, 2008]. DNA methylation is perhaps the best
characterized chemical modiﬁcation of the chromatin [Goldberg et al., 2007]. The
chemical marks on the genome determine the activation or silencing of certain DNA
sequences. This mechanism is responsible for the diﬀerentiation of embryonic cells
into diﬀerent cell types and tissues with diﬀerent functions. One way to describe
this notion is as an analogy to a cookbook. All the cells in our body carry the
same cookbook, but diﬀerent cell types are using diﬀerent recepies. The genetic
information for making the epithelial cells of the skin is turned oﬀ in the neurons
and vice versa. Such epigenetic variations remain preserved through the process of
cell dividing. Although most epigenetical changes happen during the diﬀerentiation
of cells from the embryonic fertilized cell, the zygote, or from stem cells during the
organism's life, further changes occur at later stages of development and life.
Such epigenetical changes are responsible for the observed diﬀerences in disease
susceptibility of mono zygotic twins, which suggests that epigenetic diﬀerences that
arise during aging are at work [Fraga et al., 2005]. Early maternal nurturing has
been shown by Weaver et. al. [Weaver et al., 2004] to have a life-long-lasting eﬀect
on DNA methylation, aﬀecting oﬀspring' response to stress by rats. Rat pups which
have been nurtured by their mothers have shown a reduced tendency to fearfulness,
compared to pups which have been less nurtured by their mothers. Such a diﬀer-
entiation might explain a mechanism through which diﬀerential parental behavior
can alter the psychological characteristics of the oﬀspring and by that prepare them
to diﬀerent environments [Weaver et al., 2004]. Maternal eﬀects on defensive re-
sponses to threat...commonly follow from the exposure of the mother to the same or
similar forms of threat and may represent examples whereby the experience of the
mother is translated through an epigenetic mechanism of inheritance into phenotypic
variation in the oﬀspring. Thus, maternal eﬀects could result in the transmission of
adaptive responses across generations [Weaver et al., 2004].
Further epigenetical mechanisms of stable and even inheritable gene expression
variations should only be mentioned, but cannot receive a detailed description within
the scope of this work. The ﬁrst group of these would be covalent and noncovalent
chromatin variation mechanisms, which work together to introduce meaningful vari-
ation into the chromatin ﬁber, and whose collective contribution to epigenetics is
only now being rigorously explored [Goldberg et al., 2007]. A further mechanism
that should be mentioned here is the inﬂuence of noncoding RNA. It has recently
become evident, that noncoding RNAs have a hand in controlling multiple epige-
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netic phenomena. These RNAs often act in concert with various components of
the cell's chromatin and DNA methylation machinery to achieve stable silencing of
DNA sequences. Some of these invoked silencing eﬀects are long-term eﬀects that
can be inherited through cell division [Goldberg et al., 2007].
The gathering evidence of epigenetical mechanisms strikes our imagination, be-
cause it delivers explanations for potential eﬀects of the environment on the expres-
sion of genes. The possibility that patterns of DNA-marking, acquired during the
life time of one generation can be passed to the next generation, has a ...deliciously
lamarckian ﬂavor that proved diﬃcult to resist as a potential antidote to genetic
determinism [Bird, 2007].
Figure 11.1.: Epigenetical Inﬂuence on Evolution's Scheme
The signiﬁcant modiﬁcation to the general ﬂow of evolution lies in the additional
and direct inﬂuence of experience on the expression of the genome. The (neo-) Dar-
winian evolutionary schema deﬁnes a rather strict chain of correspondence between
inheritance, the genome and environmental selection. The epigenetical paradigm
suggests additional paths of correspondence between selection, gene expression, or-
ganism's performance and the genome, as illustrated in ﬁgure 11.1.
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TWELVE
IMPLICATIONS OF LAMARCKIAN LOGIC FOR
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION
The insight that social and economic evolution features the logics of Lamarckian evo-
lution is not new to evolution theorists and meta theorists. Evolution economists
indeed recognized the weaknesses of pure Darwinist logic in explaining economic
and sociological development processes. However, variation from this reasoning or
dissociation from it has been conducted in a very hesitant manner and expressed
with a rather apologetic spirit. Attempts at the extension of Darwinism beyond the
borders of evolutionary biology through further abstraction, have been conducted
in order to create the heuristic concept of universal (sometimes named general)
Darwinism, keeping the three main principles of Darwinism at their core of evolu-
tionary theorizing: blind variation, selection and retention [Witt, 2008]. In other
cases, researchers almost seem to have had a rebellious thrill as they turned to search
for an economical evolution theory deliberated from the burdens of ideas borrowed
from biology 1 or biological analogies. That is probably due to the perceived general
acceptance, virtual hegemony, of neo Darwinism in biology over the best part of the
twentieth century. And perhaps due to the still persistent self esteem of economics
as a natural science.
Hodgson [Hodgson, 2001] recognized a problem arising from the recognition of
the Lamarckian characteristic of social evolution and opened his essay stressing that
The prevailing wisdom in biology is that Lamarckian ideas are untenable, at least
in the biotic context. raising the apparent question of ...theoretical inconsistency
between biology and the social sciences and adding to it the resulting dilemma
Can we be Lamarckian in the social sciences and Darwinian in biology? Is there a
contradiction here? Can we be Protestants and Catholics at the same time?.
However, recent2 evidences and recognitions in biology, supporting the validity
1Translated by the author from [Witt, 1987], p. 88.
2If the above mentioned contribution of Hodgson [Hodgson, 2001] in a journal dedicated to Dar-
winism and evolutionary economics should be considered as representative, it is only an aston-
ishing demonstration of the slow pace and low intensity of exchange between the two disciplines;
the biological and social sciences. That is although they claim to be sharing the same logics
43
Implications of Lamarckian Logic for Economic Evolution
of evolutionary principles, originally formulated by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck already
50 years before Darwin had published his evolution theory, might spare economic
theorists the need to take sides and either accept or reject biologic evolution logic
per se.
The adaptation of Lamarckian evolution theory also to economics, may release
economic theorists from the danger of having a bad ethical conscience (or even the
risk of being blamed for racism) while maintaining the position of economics as a
discipline cognate to natural sciences. At the same time it would enable theorists to
highlight some evolutionary mechanisms and principles crucial for the understanding
of social and economic processes.
Refering to ontogenetic change of organizations, Witt [2005 p. 349] mentions liter-
ature dealing with organizational life cycle that ...rely on the analogy to regularities
of ontogenetic morphological development of single organisms in nature. He then
questions this idea of organizational life cycle by raising two questions:
- A ﬁrst and very basic question that may be raised is why organizational change
should be expected to give rise to stereotypic developmental patterns such as
succession of organizational states. Since there is nothing comparable to a
common causation like the genetic program, which expresses itself, it is not
clear where a stereotypical development corresponding to the life cycle metaphor
should come from.
- A second question is what organizational features one should look for in seek-
ing empirical evidence for analogies to the systematically changing morpholog-
ical features of organisms. Development may be expressed by changes in the
structure or quality of an organization (as they are indicative of morpholog-
ical development). However, there is no eye-catching empirical evidence for
stereotypic changes in organizational structure or quality as there is evidence
for the development of organisms.
As for the ﬁrst question, this problem can be solved through a rather Lamarckian
understanding of development in nature. Actually there is much less of a common
causation like the genetic program in nature itself than pure Darwinian evolution
might suggest. The genetic program might determine the ways an organism could
regulate its mechanisms of change. It can determine, for instance the capability of
an immune system to learn to resist a new antigen. But it does not, and does not
need to, contain all the programs for developing antibodies for all possible antigens.
The basic notion of Lamarckian evolution is the adaptation of not only the patterns
themselves, but also the adaptations of the patterns for pattern adaptation. The
second question becomes superﬂuous if the unprogrammed Lamarckian change is
being accepted, as there is no more of a programmed morphological change in natural
organisms than could be expected for organizations.
The Lamarckian concept of evolution allows a simultaneous inﬂuence of both
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of organisms. Adaptation of Lamarckian
and semantics
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logics would provide the legitimation for the application of adaptation processes as
means of variety generation in the sense of evolutionary innovation. Lamarckian
rationale allows for a much more active role attributed to the organism as well as
to the social entity in shaping its own development than the Darwinian mutation-
selection thesis. The choices, decisions and the resulting behavior of the organism,
stimulate changes in its own organ, which in their turn are being transfered to the
following generations of that organism. This notion allows the acceptance of an
interactionist perspective, stressing that the agent and the environment are both
the outcome of the last process [Hodgson 2005, p. 114].
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CHAPTER
THIRTEEN
SELECTION AS A RATIONAL DECISION OF THE
SELECTED ENTITY
Economic evolution in the theory of the ﬁrm, as we know it, is based on the Schum-
peterian inspired notion, formulated by Nelson and Winter [Nelson & Winter, 1982],
of selection in populations. Following the principles of Darwinian selection, Nelson
and Winter deﬁne eﬃciency of organizations in making proﬁt as the determinant of
their survival. The result and therefore the indication for organizational evolution-
ary success is its expansion and size1. A very basic question should be raised: Don't
proﬁtable enterprises ever exit?
Especially the agricultural production market demonstrates a high rate of aban-
doning of survival-capable enterprises. Not the enterprises themselves are the en-
tities that perish, but much more it is the idea, or the behavior, of running these
enterprises which are being abandoned.
According to Nelson and Winter's rationale, the population of organizations di-
vides itself into organizations which grow and expand, and those which decline and
disappear. Although very often denied, this evolutionary mechanism implies a very
simple and rational criterion for survival. Moreover, it implies a population equi-
librium. If the enterprise is proﬁtable, it would continue not only to exist, but also
to expand. If and only if it is not proﬁtable, it will exit. In the organizational
economics, the focus of discussion is how to deﬁne exit as part of the life cycle of
organizations, at the organisations population level. Organizations disappear from
the population in diﬀerent ways. Organizations can dissolve, but they can also dis-
appear when they merge into or being taken over by other organizations. What
ever the case may be, the exit of the organization is not always being externally en-
forced, much more often it is a result of a conscious decision of the entrepreneur(s)
to discontinue its activity in the same form in which it has been active till that
point.
This is a grave diﬀerence between economical and natural selection and evolution.
1The size of an organization as an appropriate measure for its ﬁtness or success will be questioned
again in part IV of this book
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Whilst one of the very basic rules of nature is the general urge to live, economic
survival is much more often a matter of a rational decision.
A crucial understanding of the process of economic selection would be achieved
through detailed formulation of this decision at the level of the individual en-
trepreneur. A general formulation of a decision equation is needed for that pur-
pose. This equation should contain the list of factors, motivations and incentives
contributing to and contributed by the continuance of the organization's activity.
A speciﬁc dependency of these factors on external conditions and internal organi-
zational features must be formulated for the speciﬁc case. These factors must then
be set in comparison to alternative opportunities, in order to determine the critical
break even point.
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FOURTEEN
CONCLUSION OF THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN
BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC EVOLUTION
Evolution in biology is a concept that demonstrates high validity through out all its
levels and the diﬀerent ﬁelds of life sciences that involves. A harmonic continuance
prevails all the way from the single atom, investigated in the ﬁeld of physical chem-
istry, through the ﬁeld of biochemistry, explaining biology at the molecular level, on
through anatomy and zoology to population ecology. All these levels of life sciences
are investigated with the same tools, under the same assumptions, they accord to
the same set of rules and are being applied each level as a complimentary expla-
nation to the others. No recognition in molecular genetics stands in contradiction
to nuclear physics and population ecology is constructed on the basis of genetical
explanations. The insights and knowledge collected through scientiﬁc investigation
is revealing the great mosaic of understanding life and nature one stone after the
other. Each recognition in physics, taking for example contemporary insights into
nano physics, can open ways and horizons for bio-chemistry, cell biology (and by
that to medicine). At least up to this point, the principles known to life sciences at
all levels and disciplines harmonize with each other. It is more likely, that a new
recognition in one of the many life sciences would change the way the whole picture
of nature is being understood. But it is rather unlikely, that a recognition at one
level would break the continuance that prevails among all life sciences. It is therefore
unlikely, that a phenomenon in cell biology would imply a new and special chemical
theory, independent from and unexplainable by the known chemistry and physics.
Such a recognition might serve as an empirical evidence, that might demand adap-
tations to the theories of physics and chemistry, but it would probably not suggest
an additional set of alternative physical and chemical conceptions.
Evolution in socio and economic sciences has not reached such a state of harmony
yet. For the purpose of investigation, let us divide the socio-economical spectrum
into three major levels: The individual (person, actor, agent) would serve as the basic
unit of investigation (analogue to the electrons, protons and neutrons, building the
atoms and up to the level of single molecules in the natural system), the institution
(ﬁrms, groups, communities) as the analogue for the organism (from the level of
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the single cell up to a whole organism), and the economic system, including its
market niches, as the analogue for the ecologic systems with the populations of
ﬁrms included in it. Obviously, this division is artiﬁcial. The individual actor
can act as a ﬁrm in the population and in the market environment, whereas the
relationship of the single cell with the organism can feature a relationship with its
environment, featuring operative characteristics of a market just as much as the
organism maintains market relationships with its environment and  simultaneously
 with the rest of its own species. Chemical ion-exchange processes can be observed
as a market (for electrons) just as much as an ecological niche could. However that
is perhaps due to the continuance in the principles driving nature, more than in
those driving social phenomena.
Economic evolution at the individual level entails diﬃculties with the direct appli-
cation of Darwinian evolution logics, as the perspective of the latter is strongly di-
rected at changes at the population level. Only through the application of Mendelian
genetics, biological analogies start to provide contemplates for the analysis of change
at the individual level. However, the analysis of economical evolution using biologi-
cal semantic reaches its borders very soon. Biological evolution speciﬁes genes and
phenotypes. The genes are the set of information, saved in the form of sequences
of chemical molecules (DNA) determine the organism's capabilities of producing a
certain set of proteins and feature a certain set of characteristics, being together
the organisms phenotype. Genes variation occurs through spontaneous combina-
tions and recombinations of DNA sequences. These variations occur as a result of
environmental inﬂuences (such as radiation or chemical substances) or as a result
of programmed mechanism well integrated into the process of reproduction. That
means, through built in mechanisms of multiplication imperfections at the stage of
cell devision and multiplication, reproduction itself serves as a variety generation
mechanism. A certain amount of mistakes is integrated into the transcription pro-
cess of the DNA during the generation of reproductive cells. Another mechanism
of variety generation is the actual notion and the reason for sexual reproduction.
Through the combination of genetical information of two individual organisms, an-
other mechanism of variety generation is created. The optimal portion of variation
during the transcription of genes is secured by the mating borders of the species
and is being optimized by evolution itself. Obviously, an optimal level of variation
is not only the force driving change in species, much more it is a key for survival
itself. However, variation itself is a random process. The organism itself cannot
have an inﬂuence over which characteristics it receives from its ancestors and which
it inherits to its oﬀspring. The organism also does not have a control over which of
the genes it carries should be expressed. The phenotype is being enforced on the
organism and they are both being selected by the environment. This is diﬀerent
in evolution in the economic context. The individual interactor possesses a charge
of information and knowledge and is acquainted with a certain variety of possible
behaviors it can choose from. According to the information it possesses, its repli-
cators, the interactor can choose to switch between behaviors in order to adapt to
changes in the environment or as reaction to the consequences of its behavior. How-
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ever, the interactor can alternatively switch to another environment according to
its assessment of the diﬀerent environmental constellations and the possible conse-
quences of each of its behavior alternatives. In case of uncertainty, the interactor
can experiment with patterns of behavior, of which consequences are not known
yet. The interactor itself, however, is not necessarily being selected, and if so, the
replicators it possesses are not necessarily being selected out of existence with the
interactor. There is therefore very little common to the genetical constitution and
the replicators of the social interactor.
Analogue to the explanatory role of biochemistry for life at the organism level,
there should be a logic continuance between the individual interactor and the repli-
cators it possesses, and the organization as the next organic level. The evolution
theory at the ﬁrm level seems to have been developed as a theoretical aggregate,
independent from the lower level, the individual. Since the publishing of Nelson
and Winter's milestone book [Nelson & Winter, 1982], the widely accepted basic el-
ement of economic evolution at the organization level is the routine. Routines are
conceived to help identifying the evolutionary principles of variation, selection and
inheritance in economic change. They are supposed to provide the unit of analysis
of economic evolution [Becker, 2003].
Routines are considered to contain a collective nature, which expresses itself
through the interaction they consist of. Since they imply a repetition, they are
widely referred to as recurrent interaction patterns, that is, collective recurring ac-
tivity patterns [Becker, 2003]. Without the collective nature, recurrent activity
patterns on the individual level best ﬁt the term 'habits'  [Becker, 2003]. According
to that notion, in order for a routine to be such, it needs to be possessed by an
organization, that is, an interaction system of more than one actor. That exclusive
deﬁnition raises questions considering its general applicability. Before the industrial
revolution, as many of the professions have been practiced by individuals, was the
craftsman only in the possession of habits? Was the smith not working according
to routines he developed for his workshop? And in modern days, as ever more free
lancers provide their services and their skills to more or less big organizations they
do not become part of, does the individual free lancer not imply routines, both in
his own activity and in his interaction, just like the organization he is working with?
Obviously, the collectivity that derivate from the element of interaction is not a
necessary condition for the existence of a routine. A routine can be individual and
still be more than just a habit. Moreover, if we agree, that routines are applicable
to individual action and behavior, there is still a diﬃculty concerning the nature of
the linkage between the cognitive and the behavioral levels. Do ﬁrms or organiza-
tions feature their own cognition? Can a behavior be attributed to an organization?
Obviously, the organization cannot be understood without consideration of its basic
element, its individual members, including their cognitions and behaviors.
An additional feature related to organizations is the natural metaphor of a life
cycle. According to this notion, an organization goes through a pattern analogue
to the life cycle of an organism, from its grounding (birth) through its growth on
to its exit from the market (death). The point of time in which an organization
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is being grounded can often be deﬁned. The processes of its development can be
followed and documented. However, there is no common causality determining the
path of change for all  or any subgroup of  the total of organizations, analogue
to the genes in nature [Witt, 2005]. But the most problematic stage in the life
cycle of organizations is the one that should deﬁne their analogue death. As already
quite early recognized [Penrose, 1952], there are many ways and patterns in which
organizations seize to exist. Firms are supposed to be selected through competition
in markets [Hannan & Freeman, 1982], which may lead to bankruptcy, take-overs,
mergers, break-ups or management buy-outs.
However, the individual actors  persons, people  who are the basic elements
combining the organization and, at the same time, possessing the single elements
of the organizations routines, continue to exist independent from the organization
itself [Hannan & Freeman, 1982]1. Moreover, in the last decades, ever more ﬁrms are
grounded as start-ups, aiming at developing, maturing and patenting an idea. Such
ﬁrms are not meant to transfer the idea into production or application in the ﬁrst
place, much more they are aiming at selling themselves, together with the idea they
possess, to larger ﬁrms which then apply the ideas or eliminate them according to
their strategic preferences. By being dissolved into other ﬁrms, these start-up ﬁrms
actually achieve their goal and are therefore cases of success rather than failure2.
If there is no element perfectly analogue to natural death in the context of organi-
zational evolution, where is the process of selection actually taking place? Hannan
and Freeman [Hannan & Freeman, 1982] argue for parallel development of theory
at both organizations population and, what they deﬁne as, organizations commu-
nity levels. In that sense, the single member provides an aggregate of analysis with
the organization as a population of members. The second aggregate of analysis is
the population of organizations. At both levels they suggest the common fate, as
a consequence of organizational success or failure at the organization's level, and
the consequence of environmental variations at the organizations' population level.
This solution of identifying the population by the common fate, drawing the popu-
lations borders according to homogeneity in terms of organizational environmental
vulnerability, does not provide a solution for the methodological identiﬁcation of
organizations species. It only enables a backward oriented identiﬁcation of popula-
tions, in the sense that a group of organizations featuring a common vulnerability to
a certain environmental change are then superﬁcially declared a species. Identifying
a species by a shared environmental vulnerability does not help in the deﬁnition
of species in the biological sense, since natural selection determines the fate of a
subgroup within the species. That means, the subgroup eliminated by selection is
not the whole species but a characteristic variation within the species' population.
The borders of species in nature are well deﬁned through the borders of genetical
combination. Since there is no perfect analogue to natural replication and repro-
duction in the socio economic context, the deﬁnition of organizations' species still
1Refer especially to page 934 in [Hannan & Freeman, 1982].
2These cases are often the counterparts  the antithesis  of make or buy decisions. they could
perhaps be named make or be bought decision cases.
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remains unsolved.
Since selection in the biological and socio-economic contexts implies a fundamen-
tally diﬀerent consequence for the survival of the interactor, as the social economic
interactors are not selected out together with their replicators, there must be a fun-
damentally diﬀerent motivation prevailing for the reproduction of ideas. In biology,
the general motivation of organisms to survive serves as a general axiom. The aim
of nature is maximum survival of the genes [Koslowski, 1998]. Since death is an in-
tegral part of life cycle, the only form of survival for the genetic load of an organism
is given by reproduction and genetical inheritance. In the socio-economic context,
reproduction of knowledge and competencies occurs through diﬀerent forms of com-
munication. One part of the communication forms are motivated by both parties,
the delivering and the receiving. Such would be publications, documentation, oral
presentation, courses, reports, consulting or apprenticeship.
A second part of the communication forms is motivated and conducted solely by
the receiving part, through observation, imitation, copying and back engineering. A
third part of communication is motivated and enforced only by the delivering party.
That would be the case of, for instance, institutional or social norms, regulations
and restrictions. However, no communication takes place in case non of the parties
are motivated to transfer information. That is not the case in biological replication.
Organisms are indeed motivated to maintain their genome. Since variation in the
genome is taking place spontaneously during the process of replication, the organism
does not have a perfect control over the genetical charge it inherits. That surely
applies to the communication of ideas as well as interactors are often exposed to
ideas they do not actively choose to know. But the oﬀspring of natural replication
cannot select the genetical charge it receives and even more, the genes it features
in its phenotype, which is quite diﬀerent from the socio-economic case. The choice,
the selection, the interpretation and the way of implementation of information and
ideas communicated in social and economic exchange systems lie all in the hands
of the receiving party of communication. The organizational analogy to natural
reproduction and inheritance is therefore imperfect.
As formulated by Edith Penrose [Penrose, 1952], one should ask the question, is
a perfect socio economic analogy to biological genetics and evolution necessary?
If so, should it be observed as an explanation, or just as a metaphor? Han-
nan and Freeman argued, that Populations of organizations referred to are not
immutable objects in nature but are abstractions useful for theoretical purpose
[Hannan & Freeman, 1982]. A further abstraction in the socio economic concept of
evolution, achieved through a shift in the focus of analytical observation from the
organization or the interactor as the basic units of populations, is suggested in the
following chapter 15.
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CHAPTER
FIFTEEN
THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS
15.1. Socio-Economic Survival of Ideas
Perhaps because economic theorists fancy their image as a discipline at the over-
lap between social-behavioral and natural sciences, economic evolution theory at-
tempted to follow the well accepted Darwinist logic, or at least hold to it as the
pivot point and a reference notion to variate upon and experiment with. In evolu-
tion economics, the notion of ideas (routines, habits, skills, information or rules of
conduct) is utilized as an analogy to the biological notion of genes, as the unit of in-
formation storage and transfer. The complex of ideas possessed by the reproducing
and selected entity1 is considered as analogue to its genome, and the capability to
make the evolutionary advantageous choice and the implementation of these ideas,
together with structural and capability attributes of the deciding entity, partially
determined by these very same ideas, are all elements of the entity's phenotype.
Selection processes apply to these phenotypes, determining their further existence
or disappearance.
It did not take long, however, before economic evolutionists reached the limits of
Darwinist principle mechanisms' ability to explain or even describe human behav-
ior, civilization systems and their development. Whilst evolution economics have
been conceived as having the potential to release micro economic theorizing from
the ties of rationality and equilibrium, the pillars of neo-classical economics, theo-
rists have not dared distancing themselves from Darwinist thinking to full extent.
The Darwinist evolutionary notion of mutation as means of variety generation re-
ceives its analogy in socio-economical evolution in the generally adopted concept of
Schumpeterian innovation (Schumpeter, 1934). However, neo-Darwinist perception
of spontaneous mutations (mistakes occurring during DNA transcription, or recom-
bination of DNA molecules triggered by chemical or physical inﬂuences) as solely
means of generating variety, could not accord with the notion of innovation, being
the basic power driving economic evolution.
1That could be an individual or an organization, as the context of observation may be.
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While spontaneous mutation assigns a rather passive role to the interactor itself,
innovation demands a very active role of the innovating actor, raising problems and
questions concerning innovators' capabilities and  even more than that  motiva-
tions. A purely Darwinist explanation of innovation would imply that all innovations
are the results of either mistakes occurring during information transfer, or lessons
learned from mistakes occurring in processes2. Such an explanation of innovation
would expropriate the human spirit from its innovative drive.
An additional problematic lies in the identity of the entities being changed and
those being selected. In biological evolution, the oﬀspring of the parent organism
feature mutations and a variety of characteristics, their phenotypes, which are then
being selected according to their ﬁtness to the constellation of environmental con-
ditions and available resources. The innovation in the sense of genetic variation is
being implied on the organism in the form of its genotype, determining its pheno-
type which is then put to the test of nature. The organism, according to Darwinist
evolution theories, has no active inﬂuence on the combination of characteristics it
features, and nature determines its survivability. The natural selection mechanism
leaves only a passive role for the selected organism, upon which the decision for
survival or extinction is being implied. The innovations, the innovators and the
population being exposed to selection are all one and the same. However, this logic
can describe social and economic evolution as long as the focus of analysis is being
turned onto groups, organizations, ﬁrms, institutions and industries as the entities,
and their populations as those which go through selection. Semantically, economic
evolution theorists, especially of the institutionalist stream, tend to relate to inno-
vative ﬁrms or institutions.
However, when relating to innovation and innovation management, it becomes
obvious from the literature, that it is not the ﬁrms or institutions which are, or
could ever be, innovative. Innovativeness is an attribute of agents, champions,
individuals or groups of individuals. And it is also these individuals who feature
incentives, interests and motivations. On the other hand, the innovative individuals
are not the entities being selected.
The notion of selection itself has diﬀerent characteristics in the biological and
economic and social contexts. In nature, selection has a quite deterministic sense.
Phenotypes which do not ﬁt are due to perish. In social systems, institutional con-
cepts which prove to be inferior might disappear, organizations dissolve, technologies
be abandoned and ﬁrms close. But in most cases we can assume with relatively much
conﬁdence; nobody would die. Agents building groups, ﬁrms, industries and insti-
tutions, are very likely to adapt themselves to a new pattern, adopt new ideas or
technologies and continue their activity in another organizational constellation. The
selection in organizations' populations is nothing else but a rational decision internal
2Due to the limited control of human beings over processes they conduct, there is always a
residual mistake existing in any process; a portion of the process being determined by nature.
Deviation of the process achieved results from the process intended results is an innovation
that can thereafter be adopted. Such unplanned achievements are the source of a big part of
the innovations of the pharmaceutical industry, where medications tested for one eﬀect often
appear to have an additional unplanned but useful eﬀect.
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to the organization itself, as emphasized in the previous section 13.
The principle identity between the phenotypes as interactors, the genotypes as
replicators and the selected entities, which is inevitable for biological evolution, does
not apply to socio-economic evolution processes. This is a cause for a substantial
discontinuance in the explanatory context of the economic evolution. A reductionist
analysis of individual agents as the basic  atomic  unit of social constructs, and the
application of social and psychological recognitions about the innovative behavior
of agents needs to be kept separate from the evolutionary ecologic perspective of
organizations populations. The continuance prevailing in life sciences, all along the
conceptual line drawn from the physical and chemical forces determining molecular
genetic processes up to the level of population ecology systems, cannot be applied
directly to the logic of economic evolution.
15.2. Memes and their Limits
The term meme has been coined as by Richard Dawkins in his book The Selﬁsh
Gene [Dawkins, 1989] of the year 1976 which, although intended to be a book about
genetics, laid the ground for the science of memetics. According to Dawkins, memes
are a new kind of replicators3 [Blackmore, 2001]. The most familiar replicator is
the gene. Dawkins created an abstract analogue of genes and organisms in the form
of replicators and the vehicles carrying them. In chapter 11 of that book he then
developed the abstract notion memes as a unit of cultural transmission analogous
to the gene. Memes and genes are diﬀerent kinds of replicators in the sense that
only genes consist of material, chemical molecules. These molecules, the DNA,
contain information in the form of strings of nucleotides, the basic units of DNA,
each consisting of one of the four bases  adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine 
linked to a sugar molecule. The information stored in the the DNA is nothing more
than a code consisting of these four digits. Memes denote a rather abstract form of
information, which is not (necessarily) featured in a material form. What genes and
memes share is the capacity to replicate themselves. In their environments, memes
like genes are due to compete with other variations of replicators of their own kind
and go through selection according to their goodness. Analogue to genes, memes
also go through variation and mutations during the process of replication.
Memes inﬂuence their surroundings and create the surrounding conditions for
the interpretation of new arriving memes introduced into their environment by
transfer. The design of the transfered meme is being altered through the receiving
surroundings. The meme that starts it journey in one surrounding in a certain
design, is not only going through a process of selection in the new environment,
but already at its arrival it is being interpreted according to the population of
memes already residing the receiving (and perceiving) environment, and adapted
to the construct they have already created. The design of the meme in the new
environment is therefor likely to diﬀer from the design it had, and its role in the new
3The term replicators has been also coined by Dawkins in this very same book.
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environment would probably alter from that it had in the old environment. We can
therefore say, that memes are not only exposed to selection, but also to mutation
already during the process of transfer. Moreover, mutations of memes do not only
occur as result of replication mistakes (such as phonetic misunderstandings), but
as of an active adaptation conducted by the population of memes in the receiving
environment. Nevertheless, memes also adapt their receiving environment already at
the moment of arrival. The causal agency of memes, being able to directly inﬂuence,
and be inﬂuenced by, their surroundings, the memome, is not an attribute common
also to genes. Genes cannot independently and directly alter the genome in which
they exist. They are rather depending on their expression as a phenotype of their
interactor and are therefore being selected indirectly. The interaction between genes,
their environment and other genes, is intermediated by the interactors.
Dawkins's concept of memes is a unit of information residing in the brain and is the
mutating replicator in human cultural evolution. As recognized by Dawkins, cultural
transmission is not unique to man. Except for the example mentioned by Dawkins, of
the existing dialect groups within the population of birds called saddleback and living
in New Zealand, we know that other species transfer knowledge, skills, methods and
routines in the form of non genetical information. However, as Dawkins writes, it
is our own species that really shows what cultural evolution can do [Dawkins, 1989].
According to Dawkins, if memes are the new replicating entities, the basis of an
evolutionary process of diﬀerential survival of replicating entities, the human culture
is the new primeval soup.
According to Dawkins, if there are replicating entities, they will almost inevitable
tend to become the basis for an evolutionary process. The replicating trait is the
fundament and the constitution of these entities, as their suggested denomination
replicators comprises. Dawkins [Dawkins, 1989]4 does not try to explain or justify
this drive to replicate, as he writes:
Throughout this book, I have emphasized that we must not think of
genes as conscious, purposeful agents. Blind natural selection, however,
makes them behave rather as if they were purposeful, and it has been
convenient, as a shorthand, to refer to genes in the language of purpose.
For example, when we say `genes are trying to increase their numbers
in future gene pools', what we really mean is `those genes that behave
in such a way as to increase their numbers in gene pools tend to be
the genes whose eﬀects we see in the world'. Just as we have found it
convenient to think of genes as active agents, working purposefully for
their own survival, perhaps it might be convenient to think of memes in
the same way. In neither case must we get mystical about it.
The remaining question is, what is the driving force behind the replication of
replicators? Why would the ﬁrst replicating molecules, created perhaps through
spontaneous chemical processes in the primeval soup, inevitably feature the will and
the drive to replicate? Just because they can do so? There is no motivation of DNA
4Refer to page 196 in [Dawkins, 1989].
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Molecules to replicate. Or is there? After all, even the urge of the vehicle  the
organism  to survive is genetically conditioned. At any case, Susan Blackmore's
notion [Blackmore, 2001], merely attributing a passive role of a selective imitation
device to the human brain, does not seem to be a satisfying solution. It seems much
more, that the driving power behind replication lies in the selecting environment,
rather than within the replicators themselves. It could be the power of nature, to
be more concrete, of physics and chemistry, driving these molecules in a Brownian
random and  at the same time  ordered motion, copying them through spontaneous
reactions, and selecting the ﬁttest of those only to variate on them and replicate them
again. But can this driving force really be just a chemo-physical force; a huge process
of the universe transferring from one to a lower potential energy level, increasing
stability of the system? The answer for this question would deliver the answer for
life itself and its purpose.
An analogue force can be applied to the case of memes. The force driving the
creation and variation of memes exists nowhere else but in their environment, the
human mind. The selecting environment evaluates memes and determines whether
they are going to spread further, creates new ideas out of the primeval soup and
puts them to the test of selection. maybe this force is actually the so called human
spirit. But the main question remains open; what is the purpose behind the human
spirit? Is it possible, that this force called the human spirit is just a meta process of
this universal process of moving towards a lower energetic level? Is it just a mean to
serve that very purpose through increasing the probability of survival of the genes?
Can memes go through the process of their own evolution just because their vehicles
try to increase the survival of its own genes? Or is there a separate force driving the
survival of memes? Memes should be diﬀerentiated from ideas. Derived by Dawkins
[Dawkins, 1989] from the Greek word mimema for that which is being imitated,
memes can be nothing more than pieces of information. Only when submitted to
the force of the human spirit, the force giving them the drive and the cause to be
created and spread, memes turn to have the power of life and together with it they
become ideas.
Let us assume, that the only urge motivating the human spirit is the urge to
survive. That implies, that all the mind-power deployed by human beings is just
motivated by our hope to crack the code of life and the universe, which would
enable them to achieve immortality. If that is the case, then what the human mind
is only out for is just to recognize superior memes and spread them in order to
help the species to advance towards immortality. It is not very diﬃcult to imagine,
considering the fact that any religion I can think of suggests some kind of a concept 
a short-cut  to some form of immortality. And in most cases, the key to immortality
is the absolute acceptance of this very religion by all human beings; a concept whose
impossibility serves as the ultimate and recursive explanation for mortality itself. If
the purpose of evolution of memes is the human being reaching immortality, then
the human being, the vehicle of memes, wants to pass these on in order to promote
survival. That could also be the explanation why the human race is the only one
possessing and developing a memome; it is probably the only race that grasped its
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own mortality and should therefore try to prevent it.
Paradoxal, however, is that mortality itself is one of the driving forces of genetic
(if not that of memetic) evolution. A fundamental part of evolution is an optimal
mortality rate and an optimal life expectancy. Without mortality, there would be
no selection and no (Darwinian) evolution. So if this hypothetical purpose is due
to be achieved and the secret for life is about to be revealed, then all evolutions,
genetic, memetic and whichever interdependent evolutions that additionally exist,
are all going to seize.
15.3. Selection of Ideas
Facing the problematic in the application of biological ecology principles into social
and economical analysis, a certain modiﬁcation of the social economic evolution is
needed. The individualistic and reductionist approaches might gain on validity, if
economists seize to search for the analogues of DNA and biochemical mechanisms of
mutation at the base of economic and social change. A further step of abstraction
might be needed, in order to release economic evolution, as analogy to biology,
from the restrains of its own not yet determined validity. Economic evolution does
not necessarily need to wait for the ﬁnal decision of the dispute over the role of
biology in psychology and sociology, in order to continue its journey into logical
empirical analysis, investigation and deeper insights into social economic processes
themselves. For a better abstractability, it could be more appropriate to turn the
focus of analysis from the actors in a social system to the mere ideas they possess.
Ideas, let it be routines, patterns5, information or knowledge, do not seize to exist
as a consequence of economical, social or institutional selection they are exposed
to. It is indeed the ideas, though, which are actually being selected. However,
instead of taking the role of selected entities in the ecological system, the entities
making choices between diﬀerent ideas  and by that selecting them  are to a
greater extent part of the selecting environment itself. The selecting entities take
decisions and make choices between ideas. They decide whether to adopt an idea or
reject it, and further on, according to the character of the idea's contents and the
constellation of conditions, they are the ones choosing weather, how and under what
circumstances to implement it. The selecting entities will be further on related to
as the possessors and/or implementors of ideas.
The evolutionary ﬁtness of ideas in the Darwinist evolutionary sense, is expressed
through their distribution and their dominance in their environment. Just like a
natural environment, the diﬀusion environment of ideas can feature borders and
contain niches, in the form of and in accordance to communicational connections
between social groups and systems. The environmental borders can be both in the
dimensions of space and time. The processes of reproduction of ideas take place
through adoption, learning and imitation by new possessors, on the market or in
5For the sake of abstraction, also cooperation, grouping or any organizational or institutional
structuring can be considered as a pattern of conduct
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the system. The decision of the possessors to implement these ideas is the actual
selection of ideas. The suppression of ideas through other ideas takes place in the
process of diﬀusion, while possessors choose to adopt some ideas over the others and
implement these. As mentioned before, suppressed ideas do not inevitably need to
perish or disappear. Just like in nature, where undeveloped life forms continue to
exist in the same environment along with highly developed life forms.
Consider a simple system in which a given routine A is the only routine known
at the point of time t0 to achieve a certain purpose. At a point of time t1, a second
routine B is being introduced. The bigger the relative share of possessors preferring
to implement routine B over A, the more (evolutionary) successful we can consider
B. Routine A may continue to exist in the form of information. According to
documentation possibilities (which are as well part of the complex of environmental
conditions faced by the ideas) they can continue to exist and remain recallable long
after their possessors have perished. But its prevalence as the chosen means to
achieve a purpose declines over time6. In the evolutionary sense we may consider
routine A as suppressed by routine B, the reproductive successfulness of routine B
as superior and the niche  the system  as dominated by it. Routine B is then
obviously ﬁtter than A.
This perspective on the ideas themselves as species and populations, is altering
from the perspective dominating evolutionary economic literature. Its advantage
lies in its capability of abstraction of reproduction and selection processes and sim-
plifying their applicability to social and economic evolution analysis purposes.
Assigning an attribute of a conscious entity and an urge of survival to ideas, or
memes, as conceived by Dawkins [Dawkins, 1989], we can also suggest a decision
scheme for the strategical struggle for survival of ideas. The meme would, according
to this scheme, direct its actions according to rational estimations of its probability
to survive in one or the other environmental constellation. Additionally, choosing
between environments, the memes would also need to decide whether it should let
itself be adapted to the constellation of other memes in the chosen environment,
or better adapt the chosen environment to ﬁt itself? The bidymentional decision
scheme of going where  doing what will be developed in detail in the following
chapter 17.
Although not preventing the further examination of organization populations in
markets and industries, the concept of selection of ideas additionally enables an ex-
amination of the ﬁtness of organizations from an individualistic  the members' 
perspective. The only adaptation needed for that purpose is the observation of the
organization itself as an abstract idea, and the decision of the individual whether to
become or remain member in the organization, as the mere process of reproduction
6Certainly, even the purposes chosen to be achieved are just as much part of the population of
ideas exposed to selection as the routines serving to achieve them. For example, the techno-
logical knowledge of mummiﬁcation methods, possessed by ancient Egyptians, has disappeared
together with its possessors. Due to lacking documentation of these techniques, and to irrele-
vance of the purpose of body conservation for the succeeding civilizations, both the means and
the purpose have been forgotten over time. The methods of mummiﬁcation have only been
reconstructed to a certain extent after intensive scientiﬁc research.
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and selection of that idea. According to this logic, an organization which attracts
new members is evolutionary ﬁtter than an organization that does not manage to
do that or even loses members. The absolute size of the organization has therefore
only a secondary signiﬁcance for its assessment. Much more signiﬁcant for the eval-
uation of the organization's performance is the ﬁrst and second reductions of the
organizational size7 function over time. The ﬁrst reduction delivers the information
about the trend and intensity of change in group size, the second derivation deliv-
ering the change in that absolute growth. An implication of this concept for the
representative case of co-operatives, as an example for organization form of humans
co-operating for a common cause, will be the main subject of part IV of this work.
7 In the sense of the number of members.
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SIXTEEN
THE CO-OPERATIVE ECOLOGIC NICHE AND THE
PROCESS OF OSMOSIS
The co-operative, as mentioned often in the literature and in this book, is a voluntary
grouping of individuals. The group membership is a consequence of a free choice of
each of the group's members. A fundamental prerequisite for making that choice
and conducting that act of being or becoming a member, is the mere information
considering the available option of membership. In that sense, the co-operative
and the membership are ideas  memes  prone to be selected. These ideas spread
in a diﬀusion process through the population of actors. This population can be
also regarded to as the market for co-operative membership. During this diﬀusion
process, the idea of membership is being selected by the actors according to their
interests, preferences and needs. The combined distribution of these through the
population of actors, could be understood as what is usually referred to as market
structure. This structure not only constallates the market for the product named
co-operative membership, but also at the same time characterizes the environmental
conditions, through which the idea of membership is due to be selected.
In the evolutionary sense, and following the notion of chapter 15, the idea of mem-
bership is being selected according to its ﬁtness in the aforementioned environmental
conditions constellation. The ﬁtness of the idea  its goodness  is measured by its
ability to serve the interests of any given actor in a way superior to the option, and
the idea, of not implementing it. In simple words, the idea of membership must
prove itself superior to the other alternatives. The ﬁtness of the idea is therefore a
relative value, measured in relation to its competing ideas.
Due to the special character of the membership idea, being the idea of joining a
group  the group of co-operative members for that matter1  the limits of its diﬀu-
sion determine at the same time the borders of the group. The group of actors who
implement the idea of membership and create the environmental niche, for whom the
idea of membership proves to be superiorly ﬁt is well deﬁned and easily observable.
1Of course, this notion is applicable to any deﬁnable group with determinable borders other than
co-operative groups, which serve here as the direct application.
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That well observable niche is therefore, by deﬁnition, the niche of specialization of
the membership idea. In that particular niche is the membership the evolutionary
superior idea.
The individual actor, playing the role of the selecting environment and choosing
whether to adopt the idea of membership and implement it, is at the same time
determining his or her own inclusion into or exclusion from the group, and at the
same time determining its position inside or outside the expertization niche of that
idea.
Consider the market as an environment, consisting of a two dimensional space
in which a large limited number of actors are freely moving. The idea active in
this environment is deﬁned merely by its own borders. Those actors constructing
the environment, who chose to implement the idea are considered to be within its
borders, and those who decide not to implement the idea are outside. Mind that
for the purpose of this illustration we are not interested in any characteristic of that
idea rather than merely its capacity to include actors from the environment into the
subspace, which is the space included within its borders. Let us imagine the border
as a closed line, determining who of the actors moving in the environment is included
within and who is outside that line. The actors constructing the environment can
therefore cross the line and move in and out of the space or move the line itself to
include or exclude themselves from the subspace of the idea. The idea's capacity to
include actors into its subspace can be expressed by the surface included within its
borders, and the surface which each actor is consuming. Since there is a maximal
density of actors within the subspace, the force that each additional actor would
need to apply in order to press itself into the subspace is going to increase over
proportionally. That would also apply, if we introduce a certain elasticity to the line
surrounding the subspace, to the actors themselves or to both.
This characteristic of limited capacity of the niche to contain members is distinc-
tive for social groups in general and to co-operative groups in particular. The mech-
anisms responsible for this limitation are discussed in detail in chapter 21 through
the notion of limited value of membership and the deterioration of this value with
the growth of the group. The general principle illustrated here is analogue to bio-
physical osmosis. The borders of the niche create the analogue to the semi-permeable
membrane. The adopted idea of being included in the group is analogue to the so-
lute within the membrane and the actors moving into the group act analogue to the
solvent inside and outside the membrane. The solution which is emerging from the
movement of actors into the circle of idea-adopters loses its potential as it is being
thinned and the potential gradient between inside and outside the circle declines
along this process. The osmotic potential is a result of the positive advantage of
membership over an alternative as illustrated in detail in chapter 21. The limitation
to the capacity of the group to contain members follows the principle of osmotic
pressure.
In the innovation theory, the common metaphor to describe the process of inno-
vations distribution is the diﬀusion. In the natural sciences, diﬀusion describes a
process in which solutes spread through volumes of solvents through the Brown-
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ian motion. For our case that analogy would demand the deﬁnition of the idea as
the analogue for the solute, spreading through the solvent environment of selective
minds. The notion of evolution developed in the preceding chapter 15, demands
an adjustment to that analogy. For our case, a distinctive border is separating
between the environments within and outside the group. The environment within
the group contains the population of actors choosing to adopt the idea of mem-
bership. By doing that they are virtually moving through the barrier, analogue to
the semi-permeable membrane, and reduce the osmotic potential of the membership
idea. Accordingly, we are actually imagining an additional process to the diﬀusion
of ideas (or innovations as a speciﬁc case), a process which is perhaps unique to the
type of ideas which contain the element of belonging to a distinguishable group of
idea-adopters: The process called osmosis of ideas.
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CHAPTER
SEVENTEEN
EXIT, VOICE OR ACQUIESCE AS EVOLUTIONARY
STRATEGY
Evolution, whether by selection or adaptation, implicates the existence of a goal.
The goal common to all evolving entities is the increase in survival probability
through the increase of ﬁtness. Fitness is speciﬁc to the evolving entity just as much
as for the interacting environment. A deer might beneﬁt from high ﬂeetness when
escaping a bear attack. Through its ﬂeetness, the result of a long ancestral period of
selection for this attribute, the deer would have lower probability of death from bear
attack in an environment populated by bears. The bears in this case are a feature of
the environment to which the deers are adapted. However, parallel to the selection
of deers, the population of bears is going through a process of selection as well.
Fleet bears are more likely to feed and less likely to be selected out by starvation.
Fleet deers are the environment to which the bears need to adapt, just as much
as the opposite. But will the attribute of selection, the ﬂeetness of the animals,
increase unendingly? Indeed, that could be the case. However, the rational strategy
for both sides, the hunter and the prey, would be to introduce a new attribute  an
innovation  to the system. Such a strategy could be the introduction of endurance,
determining which of the animals would be the last to give up the chase, the deer
running for its life or the bear chasing its prey. Or it could be the ability to climb
trees, in order to escape a predator and in order to chase a prey, as the case may be.
Such an innovation would enable more eﬃcient means for tackling an environmental
challenge than simply increasing one ability such as ﬂeetness. It becomes obvious
that both animals are at the same time the cause and the artifact of the evolutionary
process of the system they build.
The evolution itself serves as means for a goal. The goal of natural evolution is the
survival of the individual organisms, implying the survival of the species. Darwin's
theory of natural evolution relies on the causal explanation of spontaneous mutation
and environmental selection of attributes. Here, survival strategies are much more
the result of selection than the means of increasing survivability. A spontaneous
mutation would provide a ﬂeeter deer, making the rest of the deers  the relatively
slower ones  more likely to be hunted, enabling the faster ones to prosper in the
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given environment. The strategies of coping with the environment can be detected
from the natural attributes of organisms and interpreted utilizing a logical conclusion
of causality. The observer builds the scheme of how certain attributes serve for the
survivability of a certain organism in a certain complex of environmental conditions.
For our exemplary case, the observation of ﬂeet deers is logically explained as a result
of out selection of the slower ones by bear attacks, and the ﬂeetness of the deers is
explained as the attribute adapting them to their bear populated environment. The
attribute of ﬂeetness is a result of a spontaneous process, which is no contradiction
to its being a survival strategy of the dears, in spite of its spontaneous occurrence.
Social evolution is, by contrast, a result of decision series  strategic decisions, nota
bene  of individual interactors. The strategies chosen serve other purposes rather
than mere survival of the deciding interactor, which as a matter of course increases
the complexity of the interaction system. The survivability of the strategy itself, the
idea, is a result of its utilities for the decision maker, but not necessarily the reason
for the idea per se.
Whether the reason or the result of evolution, strategies in both natural and social
systems can all be equally classiﬁed into the same fundamental categories. The ﬁrst
dimension of classiﬁcation, two major strategy classes are to be considered:
- Adaptation to the niche. This class features the group of all strategies serving
for the actor to adapt its competencies to the conditions of its immediate
environment. This category implies adapting of behaviors and activities of
the interactor to the given resources and the limiting and stressing factors. It
also includes all means of recognizing and exploiting opportunities in the given
environment.
- Adaptation of the niche. This class features the group of all strategies serving
for the actor to adapt its immediate environment to its own competencies and
needs. This category implies behaviors and activities of the interactor aimed
at changing the given resources, their availability, and the limiting stressing
factors, in order to adapt these to its own competencies.
The second dimension of classiﬁcation is the qualiﬁcation speciﬁcation to location:
- Speciﬁc niche specialization, in adapting to the niche as well as in adapting
the niche itself, is likely to inhibit migration between niches.
- Trans niche qualiﬁcation, in adapting to the niche as well as adapting the niche
itself, is likely to disburden migration between niches to ﬁt competencies.
The higher the niche-speciﬁcation of qualiﬁcation, the lower is the probability of
niche-exit as the rational strategical solution. The speciﬁcation of qualiﬁcation noted
as the ﬁrst dimension of classiﬁcation, can apply to the capability to adapt oneself
just as much as to the capability to adapt the niche to the own needs. Therefore,
the range of niches that the actor can adapt, or adapt itself to, could inﬂuence the
choice between strategies of the two former categories and a strategy of the third
category, the migrational strategy.
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Speciﬁc Niche Specialization Trans Niche Qualiﬁcation
Adaptation acquiesce ; expertise acquiesce ; exit
voice ; expertise voice ; exit
Table 17.1.: Decision Dimensions of Evolutionary Strategies
As can be seen from this notion, strategies of the ﬁrst two categories can be
deployed in combination with strategies from the third. Analogue we can present
the process of decision as the determination of a combination of strategies of the two
dimensions of classiﬁcation deﬁned before. A simpliﬁed formulation of the process
ensues through the formulation and solution of the two simpliﬁed questions:
- Go where? Options: Expertize on a given niche, or switch to another niche to
ﬁt competencies (Exit).
- Do what? Options: Adapt niche (Voice), or adapt competencies (Acquiesce).
The answers accord to the interactors (estimated) qualiﬁcation and can be formu-
lated as the combinations illustrated in table 17.1.
To demonstrate this notion, let us consider a hypothetical situation. A farmer
is cultivating a ﬁeld of corn on a hill next to a river. Just as the corn is about to
ripe, the farmer notices a family of wild hogs feeding from his ﬁeld. In addition to
several other, the farmer considers several feasible solutions: He may just accept
the damages caused by the hogs and keep cultivation the ﬁeld like before, carrying
the damages of declined yields. By that tactic, our farmer chooses to insist on
his ﬁeld (expertise on his niche) and tolerate the change in conditions (acquiesce).
Alternatively, the farmer may build a fence around his ﬁeld to keep the hogs away.
By that he chooses to insist on maintaining his ﬁeld (expertise on niche) and adapt
his resources to the given situation (adapt niche). Let us imagine, however, that the
farmer observes a feasible alternative to establish a new ﬁeld on the other  ﬂatter
 side of the river. He might need to tolerate more often ﬂooding of his ﬁeld in the
lower terrain, but he escapes the threat of the hogs to another area, where they have
not arrived yet (exit and acquiesce). Otherwise, the farmer may choose to move to
cultivate a new ﬁeld on the other side of the river and use the ﬂat terrain on the new
site to dig a water duct around his ﬁeld to keep the hogs, and maybe even ﬂoods,
away (exit and adapt new niche). Whether combination the farmer would choose is
depending on his qualiﬁcations in either building fences or digging aqueducts, and
on the costs and gains (in form of prevented damage) each one of the options is
likely to yield.
The diﬃculty involved in the decision is the complexity of the given alternatives.
The interactor needs to simultaneously compare between the estimated consequences
of three options according to its own given qualiﬁcations. Especially diﬃcult is con-
ducting such a decision under the situation of an aversive event. In order to accel-
erate the decision process under such a situation, in particularly under a life threat,
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the organic brain features a rather automated reaction, which is the activation of
the parasympathetic nerve system. This mechanism will be the subject of section
18 to follow.
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EIGHTEEN
EXIT, VOICE OR ACQUIESCE AS A FIGHT, FLIGHT
OR COPE REACTION
The ﬁght or ﬂight behavior is the denomination for a syndrome of reactions demon-
strated by animals and humans in the face of aversive events. It is regarded to
as the prototypic human response to stress. First investigated by Walter Cannon
[Cannon, 1915], as a result of his interest in traumatic shock reactions of soldiers
during the ﬁrst world war, ﬁght or ﬂight describes the physiological neurobiological
response of animals to physical threat . The physiological respond described by
Cannon, involves the activation of the sympathetic nervous system, that innervates
the adrenal medulla, producing a hormonal cascade that results in the secretion
of catecholamines, especially norepinephrine and epinephrine (adrenaline), into the
bloodstream [Taylor et al., 2000]. These hormones accelerate the heart and lung
activity, and inhibits energy consuming and for the immediate survival less crucial
activity of the stomach and upper intestinal system, slowing or stopping digestion.
Further eﬀects are the constriction of the blood vessels in many parts of the body
with simultaneous dilation of blood vessels for the muscles and deliberation of nu-
trients for muscular activity, auditory exclusion, loss of peripheral vision and several
other physiological eﬀects regulating the resources of the body to facilitate urgent
physical violent activity. Deakin and Graef [Deakin J. F. William, 1991] deﬁned
aversive stimuli as such that motivate avoidance behavior. This deﬁnition encom-
passes negative incentives and re enforcers and much of what passes under vaguer
terms such as punisher and stress [Deakin J. F. William, 1991]. Whether the
human or the animal ﬁghts or ﬂees in response to sympathetic arousal depends on
the nature of the stressor. If the organism estimates a stressor or predator as likely
to be overcome without severe damages to itself, the organism is more likely to
attack. In case of immense danger, ﬂight is more likely to be the chosen tactic.
An appropriate and modulated stress response is the core of survival. An organism
whose response to stress was successful is more likely to pass that response on to
subsequent generations. The correct estimation of the stressor and the choice of
the correct response, resulting in the highest likelihood for survival, increases the
likelihood of inheritance of the correct response itself, making the ﬁght or ﬂight an
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evolved response [Taylor et al., 2000].
Flight itself can take several diﬀerent forms. In addition to physical distancing
from a source of stress, ﬂight can also take a sensory form. A cammelion might
change its color to camouﬂage itself and appear not to be there, other species,
such as deers, might stand still in hope not to be noticed, and further others, such
as several species of beetles, might even play dead in hope that the attacker would
loose interest.
Activation of the sympathetic nervous system is recognized to occur in reaction
to any form of stress, including attacks by predators, assaults by members of the
same species or other dangerous conditions such as ﬁre, ﬂoods, earthquake or storm
[Taylor et al., 2000]. However, in addition to physical threats, and especially in so-
cial systems, stress can also originate in communication and interactions within the
social system itself. Such aversive stimuli trigger the activation of the sympathetic
nervous system. The appropriate reaction, however, cannot feature the simpliﬁed
scheme of ﬁghting or ﬂeeing the stressor. Especially in modern times, human re-
action to stress can be manifested in further forms, additional to actual ﬁghting or
ﬂeeing behaviors. Fighting can be manifested in angry, argumentative behavior. In
the social context, ﬂight response can be manifested in social withdrawal, television
viewing or surﬁng the Internet. All responses, however, are triggered by the sym-
pathetic nervous system. Since in the social constellation, no actual physical ﬁght
or ﬂight reactions are available options for confronting aversive events, long lasting
states of stress are often created. Due to the immense distortion of the hormonal
balance through the response to aversive stimulus, an enduring stress (real or just
conceived) creates a massive disturbance of the organic function.
Alternative reactions to ﬁght or ﬂight are provided by a variety of behavioral re-
actions, all designed to deliver solutions for coping with an aversive stimulus. Taylor
et. al. [Taylor et al., 2000] analyzed generic diﬀerences in the choice of behaviors
under stress. according to Taylor et. al. [Taylor et al., 2000], the decision whether
to ﬁght or to ﬂee as a response to sympathetic arousal is not only depending on
the nature of the stressor, as thought before. A further special diﬀerentiation in
the reaction appear between diﬀerent genders of the species. Although stress re-
sponse does not seem to vary substantially between human males and females in its
neuroendocrine core; both seem to feature similar hormonal processes of activation.
Females, however, appear to feature neuroendocrine mechanisms inhibiting ﬁght or
ﬂight behaviors and facilitating alternative  tending  behaviors, mainly aimed at
protecting oﬀspring, retrieving them from threatening circumstances, calming them
down and protecting them from further threat [Taylor et al., 2000]. Additional to
tending behaviors, females demonstrate stronger tendency to bond with other  es-
pecially other female  organisms, in order to cooperate, support and by that reduce
threats and increase likelihood of oﬀspring survival [Taylor et al., 2000]. Tend and
be-friend is a speciﬁc strategy choice featuring an alternative to technical ﬁght or
ﬂight behaviors. According to the demands introduced by the survival conditions
and the organism's cognitive capabilities, other strategies can be chosen. Zooplank-
ton in the waters, for instance, does not feature the capability to ﬁght nor to ﬂee a
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predator. The chosen strategy of survival of such organisms is massive multiplica-
tion that should compensate the high rate of mortality. The complex of strategies of
superior organisms, to actively protect the oﬀspring, is a part of a strategy complex
containing the choice to protect the small amount of oﬀspring on one hand, together
with the strategy of keeping the number of oﬀspring in such dimensions, that can
be protected in the ﬁrst place, on the other hand. It is therefore not easy to point
at the cause and the result of the strategy complex evolution. Was the cognitive
ability to make decisions the initial condition for reducing the number of oﬀspring
to amounts that can be protected? Or was this cognitive ability a result of the
necessity to protect the small and precious number of oﬀspring in order to secure
survival?
The notion, featured through the metaphor of ﬁght or ﬂight mechanisms, has
suggested that neuroendocrine mechanisms are activated as an immediate response
to stress in order to facilitate appropriate decision making  the choice of survival-
eﬃcient behaviors  under urgent situations. However, as new evidences of neuro-
biological research show, the mere situation of making decisions, or merely needing
to make decisions, involves the activation of the unconscious, as well as the con-
scious areas of the brain. It is therefore to expect, that decision making itself is a
process conducted in areas of the brain related to those acting under stress, there-
fore activating signals being interpreted by the organ as under-stress activity. In the
physiological perspective, a situation of decision making is for itself being interpreted
as a stress situation, initiating stress alert in the organism.
It is easy to recognize the correspondence of ﬁght, ﬂight or freeze rationale of
choice to the categorization of strategies suggested in the former chapter 17. Both
characteristic decision situations commonly feature the basic elements of strategic
decision situations:
- Aversive event or situation.
- Alternative strategies to be chosen from.
- Strategy classiﬁcation according to the two classiﬁcation dimensions formu-
lated in the former chapter 17.
It could therefore be claimed that both Fight, Flight or Cope and Exit, Voice
or Acquiesce are special cases of the general strategy conﬁguration of the two clas-
siﬁcation dimensions; choice of location, adapting the location or adapting to the
location. In the following part IV of this book, the rational logic of exit, voice or
acquiesce strategies is going to be implied to the case of co-operative membership.
The individual member's response to an aversive situation is going to be analysed
according to the detailed formulation of the costs and beneﬁts of each of the three
strategic options.
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CHAPTER
NINETEEN
INTRODUCTION TO PART IV
In this part of the book I intend to attempt what Albert Einstein would probably
call a thought experiment [Isaacson, 2007]. As a thought experiment it provides
information that does not come from the reporting of new empirical data. My
intention is to make use of well established experimental ﬁndings in order to deter-
mine a launch point for a deductive theory. The theory itself does not contain a
description of the empirical patterns underlying it. Much more it is attempting to
illustrate a human phenomenon and to ﬁnd its evidence and its explanation within
the illustration itself.
The imaginative visualized scenario underlying the introduced theory, is the situa-
tion in which a member of a growing group is considering the individual consequences
of the group's development and the available options of action. The extrinsic and
intrinsic incentives for group membership and their dependency on the structural
size of the social group are well investigated. Integrating these into one system of
arguments will enable us to understand the characteristic of social group growth.
The subject of the experiment is the simple social construct and management form
epitomized in the cooperative organization.
The ﬁrst step of the following experiment is the introduction to the general para-
dox of organization growth and declining cohesion of the co-operative group. The
second step is the formulation of the limited value of membership for the individual
member, formulating the functional connection between the size of the group and
the utility drawn by the member. The third step is the formulation of the strategic
choices the individual member confronts at the point at which his or her utility from
membership is no longer positive. This step will also demonstrate the inﬂuence of
the group-size on the outcome of the rational choice between exit, voice or acqui-
esce, showing that the tendency of the individual member to leave the group rises
with the growth of the group. That is perhaps a formal explanation for the known
notion of decreasing group cohesion as a result of membership structure. At the
fourth step we shall leave the level of the individual member and turn to analyze
the inﬂuence of the individual members' behavior on the structure of the group.
This step will formulate the dynamic relation between the growth of the group due
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to entrance of new members and the resulting behavior of the members, causing in
its turn the retardation of the growth itself and bringing the size of the group to a
state of dynamic equilibrium. The ﬁfth and last step turns the focus from the level
of the single organization to the level of organizations population in their market
environment. This step demonstrates the positive eﬀect of the organization at state
of dynamic equilibrium in its environmental niche, the market system. These ﬁve
steps are intended for creating the multilevel perspective, attempting to cover the
complete spectrum of ecological interdependencies between the individual member,
the organization and the market environment.
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TWENTY
THE CONTRADICTING FORCES SHAPING THE
COOPERATIVE GROUP'S SIZE
The cooperative is by its nature, not only a form of governance, but also a group of
individuals, who join their forces in order to fulﬁll a common economical purpose.
By serving a common cause, the members of the group also fulﬁll a series of personal
- non economical - needs. While serving the cause of maintaining competitiveness,
increasing the size of the group has a negative inﬂuence on the perception of the
group by the individual member. The later has a negative eﬀect on the performance
of the group itself.
The number of members in cooperation has been considered to have a great sig-
niﬁcance for the analysis of cooperatives. The cooperatives' ability to attract new
members, as reﬂecting through the number of members (size) in the group, has
been used in earlier analyses of cooperatives as an important measure for their
performance and success. The bigger the group the more successful is the coop-
erative considered to be [Ringle, 1989]1. However, while analyzing the diﬀerent
motivations for co-operative membership, these must be divided into two groups:
economical and intrinsic. Whereas a big group has a better chance for economical
success, only a relatively small group, in which the individual member has a good
perception of his inﬂuence and signiﬁcance in the process of making decisions, can
satisfy his intrinsic motivations. Therefore one of the group's characteristics, which
are essential for the engagement of new and old members, is a relative small size
[Ringle, 1999, Kleer, 1985, Verrucoli, 1985]2. Although each one of these two con-
tradicting interests has been mentioned in the literature before, the eﬀect of this
contradiction itself on the size of the group seems to have been ignored.
These two interests also denote that the size of the group is not only a result
of its success and of the grade of its members' satisfaction, but reciprocally, the
satisfaction of the members is also a negatively dependent function of their group's
size. A successful group, which manages to keep its members satisﬁed, would be at-
1Refer especially to p. 128 in [Ringle, 1989].
2Refer especially to p. 4 in [Ringle, 1999], p. 363 in [Kleer, 1985], and to p. 391 in
[Verrucoli, 1985].
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tractive for new potential members and would therefore keep growing. This growth,
however, would cause a decrease in the members' grade of satisfaction. How can
this contradiction be solved? How do these two forces come to a state of balance?
The aim of this work is to suggest a method for determination and quantiﬁcation
of this balance and the way it is being reached. For that purpose, the size of the
group must be treated separately from the size of the co-operative enterprise. The
enterprise may and must grow, in order to assure its economical success. The group's
size may and - as shown later in this work - can only grow up to a certain limit under
a given set-up. This recognition is crucial for a sober formulation of expectations
applied to the growth process of a cooperative group and the implementation of its
size as a measure for its performance assessment.
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TWENTYONE
THE RATIONALITY AND LIMITED VALUE OF
MEMBERSHIP
21.1. The Limited Value of Membership
The following model is designed to delineate a co-operative enterprise purchasing a
single homogeneous product from its members, and adding to its value by processing
and marketing it. The co-operative is assumed to be acting as price taker on the
market. The costs of the enterprise's activity is assumed to be a convex function and
the earnings, due to a set price received for the cooperative product on the market,
a concave function of the processed quantity. Co-operative members are assumed to
judge the desirability of membership on the basis of the incumbent ﬁrm's prevailing
price, whereas members are price takers in respect to dealing with the cooperative as
well as with a competing purchaser [Sexton, 1986b]. Acting according to individual
rationality, each agent would remain member in the co-operative group as long as
he or she receives at least as much as from acting unilaterally i.e. marketing the
product otherwise [Sexton, 1986a, Staatz, 1987, Zeuli & Bentancor, 2005].
Consider a group of Gmembers who join forces to produceM(G) units of a certain
co-operative product which they sell on the market for a certain price1 P . When the
demand for production capacity exceeds a critical level, the average total cost will no
longer decrease, but rather increase over-proportionally a function of the production
quantityM . The progression of the average total costs curve is therefore assumed to
feature the classical U-Form [Olson, 1965], applying also to non co-operative enter-
prises. The co-operative costs and the revenues W = PM are distributed between
the members according to their relative portion on the total production quantity of
the group, so that the individual total costs of member i are Ki = (mi/M)×K and
the individual revenues of each member are Wi = (mi/M)×PM , whereas mi repre-
sents the portion of member i in the total production quantityM of the co-operative
and Ki and Wi are respectively the member's shares in the resulting costs and rev-
1The market is assumed to be large enough, so that the group is considered as price-taker i.e. the
quantity produced does not have an inﬂuence on the market-price of its product.
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enues. In order that the members take part in the co-operative, there must be a pos-
itive utility for each of them [Olson, 1965, Sexton, 1986b, Zeuli & Bentancor, 2005].
Πi = Wi − Ki ≥ 0 is therefore the gross value of membership for each member i.
Moreover, each of the members could market the same product alternatively, either
alone or by utilizing the services of another source, having alternative costs Kai and
achieve alternative proﬁts Πai [Sexton, 1986b]. The options for proﬁts which the
members face are hence
Πi = Wi −Ki = miP − (mi/M)K = mi(P −K/M) (21.1)
or
Πai = miP −Kai (21.2)
The quantity mi that the member would alternatively market is assumed to be
the same as his or her share on the cooperative production, and they would sell their
product to the same market price. In order that they take part in the co-operative,
the proﬁt that they achieve by the membership2 must be higher than the proﬁt
which they could achieve by their own. The condition for membership is therefore
Πi − Πai = mi(P −K/M)−miP +Kai ≥ 0 (21.3)
The diﬀerence on the left side of the equation we mark as Ψi the net value of
membership and its positive value is a necessary condition for membership in the
group:
Ψi = Kai − (mi/M)K ≥ 0 (21.4)
Or:
Kai ≥ (mi/M)K (21.5)
Thus, it becomes obvious that the member's share in the cooperative production
costs must be smaller than the costs which would be caused by the alternative mar-
keting3. Assume that the production quantity of the co-operative must be expanded
by a unit of quantity for each entrance of an additional member to the group. When
the convex cost function begins increasing over [0,M(G)], the condition for mem-
bership cannot be guaranteed. We should then expect the net value of membership
to become null or negative at some stage for any member4.
2 No attempt is done here to quantify the portion of individual non economical motivations'
fulﬁllment in the composition of the total utility the member receives from membership. It is
enough to measure the cost, for which the member would exit the group, as an indicator for
his or her total utility.
3The acquainted reader might recognise the logical correspondence of this disequation to Hamil-
ton's law of kin selection
4We assume a heterogeneous group. Otherwise the membership would lose its value for the whole
group at one point.
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21.2. The Complementary Strategic Options: Exit
and Voice
Consider a co-operative of G members is considering the option to accept an addi-
tional member. One of the group members disagrees. The group's size has reached
its limit for this member; the membership still yields a positive value for the mem-
ber at this point, but any further growth would cause the exceeding of her price-
threshold. Since the member's alternative production costs are about to be exceeded
by her share in the cooperative production costs, she now needs to make her strate-
gic choice between exit and voice [Hirschman, 1970]. The option to exit means
that the member could leave the group and produce her product independently. As
a result of this choice, the group looses one member, so that the number of members
in the group drops shortly to G−1. After the member's exit, the group would accept
the new member and even up its size back to G. At that point, the group would
reach its original size again, which would have justiﬁed for the exiting member to
remain in the group.
Since there is a positive probability of inﬂuencing the group's decision and pre-
venting the new member's entrance, voice would be the rational choice. Moreover,
the option to exit is not eliminated by the option to protest. As Zhu, Hendrikse
and Krug demonstrated [Zhu et al., 2006], exit not only remains as a last resort,
but underpins member's voice making the threat more credible, and can therefore
also be used as an instrument of pressure by the protesting member. By choosing
the option voice, the member could raise a protest and by that, try to prevent the
further negative development of the group. Among the loyalty of the member to
the group and the uncertainty, considering the further negative development of the
organization after her - perhaps irreversible - exit, one of the main determinants for
the choice of voice is how high the member estimates the chances to inﬂuence and
amend the organization.
In case the member chooses the option voice and raises her protest, there is a
certain chance for an eﬀective protest, and that the entrance of the new member
into the group can be prevented. This chance is depending on the total number
of group members and on the relative share of the protesting member in the total
production. The size of the group determines the following factors:
 The probability of determining the outcome of a democratic election becomes
lower the bigger the group grows5 [Taylor & Yildirim, 2005, Borck, 2002].
 The costs of voice increase since there is a larger number of persons that need
to be reached [Downs, 1957] and
 The probability to inﬂuence the group decreases with increasing anonymity in
the group and decreasing interaction intensity within it [Butler & USDA, 1988].
5Typical to cooperatives is the principle of one person - one vote.
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Therefore, the bigger the group the smaller is the chance to inﬂuence it. Indeed,
the member's share on the total co-operative production is another determinant for
his or her inﬂuence on the group. The bigger the relative share of the objecting
member i in the total co-operative production, the greater is the inﬂuence she has
on the group.
However, the relative share of the individual member on the total production also
decreases as the group grows. In case the strategy of voice is successful after all,
the member succeeds to prevent more new entrances, and holds up the growth of
the group for a longer period before she exits6. In that case, the protesting member
has her aim achieved, she remains a member in the group and the group maintains
its size G. If the protest is not eﬀective, the new member is being accepted and
the number of members in the group shortly rises to G + 1. The unsuccessfully
protesting member exits at this point and the number of members drops back to G.
The member that we are observing is facing two alternatives with three possible
outcomes. The ﬁrst alternative is to leave the group and acquire his or her share on
production or service from another source and for a price known to this member.
The outcome of the choice to exit is certain since the member is either aware of
an actual alternative source, or has already included the risk discount factor into
the calculation of his or her alternative costs Kai. The choice of voice has two
possible outcomes; either the member is able to inﬂuence the rest of the group and
prevent the entrance of the new member, in which case the group maintains its
initial size it had on the beginning of the day, or the new member is being accepted.
However, in case the loud protest is not eﬀective, and the group decides to accept
the new member in spite of it, the protesting member still maintains his or her
option to exit the group. In this case, our observed member whose share on the
common production costs has been exceeded would take the rational choice and exit
the group for the sake of her - now lower - alternative production costs. Again, the
total number of members in the group remains the same as at the beginning of the
day.
The situation in which a co-operative group is about to decide whether to accept
a new member, an option to which a member in the group objects, is a strategic
decision situation for the member. The procession and consequences of that decision
for the member and for the group will be considered in the next section.
21.3. An Empirical Model for Exit and Voice
Preferences of Individual Group Members
Consider a co-operative member i who draws a net value ΨGi from membership,
attained by the diﬀerence between her alternative costs for oﬀering her product on
the market Kai, and her relative share in the co-operative costs Kmi. As the total
6The chance for eﬀective protest is also depending on the form of government; a cooperative is
assumed to have a free entrance, whereas in a club, the members have more inﬂuence on the
process of new members' selection and acceptance
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co-operative costs is a convex function of the number of members in the group G,
this diﬀerence is a concave, continuous and twice diﬀerentiable function over G such
that ∂2ΨGi /∂G
2 < 0 for all G, and there exists a range [G∗i , G
∗∗
i ] of the number of
co-operative members so that
¨
ΨGi > 0, G
∗
i ≤ G ≤ G∗∗i
ΨGi < 0, otherwise
(21.6)
Figure 21.1 gives the graphical representation of the relations of these functions.
Figure 21.1.: The Relations between the Membership Costs and Utility Functions
and the resulting Range of Positive Utility
We now observe the situation in which the group has reached the size G∗∗i for
which ΨG=G
∗∗
i > 0. For G
∗∗ + 1 the net value of membership would be negative for
the observed member i. The observed member has now the choice between three
options: exit inducing costs Ce, voice inducing costs Cv, or acquiesce, i.e. accepting
the entrance of a new member and taking on a negative value of ΨGi which we mark
as the cost Ca. In addition to the direct costs of reorientation and adjustment, the
costs of exit include also the risk involved and the loss of intrinsic surplus caused
by breaking the member's commitment (or loyalty) to the group and switching to
another business partner. Since the commitment to the group is declining as the
group grows and anonymity of the individual member rises, Ce is considered as a
positive and declining function of G. On the other hand as the group grows, the
costs involved in pivoting its decision7 are rising, so that Cv is a constant rising
7We deﬁne Cv as the cost for the member to secure that the group decides to refuse the entrance
of an additional member to the group.
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function of G. Therefore there is a critical size γ∗i of the group, for which Cv > Ce
when G > γ∗i , and Cv < Ce when G < γ
∗
i . For member i, the advantage of voice
over exit and vice versa pivots at a certain group-size γ∗i . Figure 21.2 gives the
relation between the costs of exit and voice as a function of G.
Figure 21.2.: The Relation between the Costs of Exit and Voice as a Function of the
Group Size G
At this stage we need to take a closer look at the cost of acquiesce Ca. As deﬁned
before, the total cost function of the co-operative enterprise features a convex U-
form. We shall now concentrate on the right half of the curve, the range in which
the costs are rising as a function of the produced quantity, and therefore as function
of the number of members in the group G. Let ∂Gj represent an addition of one
member to the group at any point j along the cost function curve. It is easy to see
that the resulting rise in the total production costs ∂Kj of the group is growing with
the number of group-members G. For a graphical presentation refer to ﬁgure 21.3.
Each group member has a point on this curve, at which it accedes his or her
alternative cost Ka which can be located anywhere between the points G∗∗ and
G∗∗ + 1. The costs of acquiesce is the actual negative utility from membership
when the number of the members in the group has reached G∗∗ + 1. This negative
utility can take any value in the range

0,ΨG
∗∗+1 −ΨG∗∗. This range however, is a
growing function of G due to the convexity of the total cost function. As graphically
demonstrated in ﬁgure 21.4, the maximal value that the cost of acquiesce can take
is a rising function of the number of members G.
Inversely phrased, when the group becomes bigger Ca can become much higher
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Figure 21.3.: The Range of Rising Cost Function
than it could if the group was still small. The payoﬀ from acquiesce is, by deﬁnition
of the point G∗∗, negative. However, the absolute value that this loss can take, i.e.
the potential net loss from membership, is also an increasing function of G. The
larger the group gets, the more likely it becomes that the rational choice of a member
would be not to tolerate the aversive membership situation. If tolerance towards
aversive situations is an expression for loyalty of the members or the cohesion of the
group, then the loss of group cohesion adjunctive to its growth, is actually becoming
apparent.
21.4. An Empirical Model for the Inﬂuence of
Group Size on Exit and Voice Preferences of
Individual Members
For the ﬁrst stage of the following decision model we need to diﬀerentiate between
two possible situations: ﬁrst, when (1) G > γ∗j ⇒ Cv > Ce, and second, when (2)
G < γ∗j ⇒ Cv < Ce. If situation (1) is the case, the member chooses the option of
exit and leaves the group. The resulting payoﬀ for the member is then −Ce. In case
situation (2) occurs, the rational choice of the member would be the option voice,
in which case the member's payoﬀ is ΨG
∗∗
j − Cv. This payoﬀ is either positive or
negative, whereas, as shown in ﬁgure 21.2, the bigger the group the higher becomes
the probability that this payoﬀ is negative, and even worse than the payoﬀ of exit.
For the second stage we need to compare the ﬁrst two options, exit or voice, with
the option to acquiesce. The payoﬀ from acquiesce is, by deﬁnition of the point G∗∗,
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Figure 21.4.: The Diﬀerent Values of Possible Negative Utilities from Membership
as an Eﬀect of the Number of Group Members
negative. However, the absolute value that this loss can take is also a function of
G. Although we can not formulate a rule for the advantage of one option over the
other, since these are determined by the concrete situation and by random factors,
we can claim a rule about the eﬀect of membership size on the advantage of any
particular choice over the other: The larger the group of co-operative members, the
higher is their rational tendency to exit and leave the group rather than to accept
its development or to raise protest and try to inﬂuence it [Lasowski & Kühl, 2008].
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CHAPTER
TWENTYTWO
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE RESTRICTING
INFLUENCE OF MEMBERS' PREFERENCES ON THE
GROWTH OF COOPERATIVE GROUPS
In chapter 21 of this book we have demonstrated the options which any group-
member faces, in the general case of dissatisfaction from membership, and the ex-
istence of an alternative. After having formulated the rationality and limited value
of membership in chapter 21, we shall now consider the size of the group itself as
the mere cause for members' dissatisfaction, and the way the frequency of this dis-
satisfaction and the behavior of the members accordingly, restrict the growth of the
group.
22.1. The Inﬂuence of Group Size on the Frequency
of Members' Dissatisfaction
Let us imagine a group, which is in a constant process of growth. For the sake of
simplicity we assume that every morning a new potential member is standing at
the door, wishing to join the group. Assuming also, that the cooperative produc-
tion quantity must be extended by a uniform quantity for every entrance of a new
member, the cooperative production costs caused thereby grow exponentially:
∂M
∂x
> 0, (22.1)
∂K
∂x
> 0,
∂2K
∂2x
> 0 (22.2)
Figure 21.3 in section 21.1 in chapter 21 features the procession of the average total
costs of the cooperative, as the group expands.
The abscissa in the diagram presents the expansion of the group. The ordinate
measures the average total costs for the cooperative caused thereby. Figure 22.1 is an
expansion of ﬁgure 21.3 in section 21.1, in the sense that it additionally expresses the
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Figure 22.1.: The Members' Alternative Average Total Costs Exceeded by the Av-
erage Total Costs of Cooperation
distribution of the group members along the ordinate according to their alternative
average total costs; the costs for which they could alternatively produce or purchase
the same product or service that the cooperation provides them. Let us assume that
each point on the ordinate presents the alternative costs of one member. For the
sake of simplicity we assume1 a uniform distribution of the group's members along
the ordinate. It immediately becomes obvious, that the number of members, whose
alternative costs are exceeded by their share on the cooperative costs, is growing
exponentially with the growing of the group (see ﬁgure 22.1):
∂Ka1
∂G1
>
∂Ka2
∂G2
(22.3)
Each producer, whose share in the cooperative costs has exceeded his or her
alternative production costs, needs to make a decision at that point. The group's
size has reached its limit for this member; any further growth would cause the
exceeding of his or her price-threshold. At this point the member is due to decide
whether to exit the group or to protest against its expansion. If the member chooses
to exit, the number of members in the group drops shortly. But the group accepts
the new member and evens up its size. At that point, the number of group members
1Yet, if we relax the assumption of uniform distribution of members on the ordinate, and assume
instead: 1) The structure corresponding to Gibrat's law, according to which ﬁrm size distribu-
tion in markets features a small number of big producers and a relatively greater number of
smaller producers [Sutton, 1997] and 2) the smaller producers would typically have higher al-
ternative production costs, so that the density of members becomes higher along the ordinate,
then we can expect an even stronger increase in the number of members, whose alternative
production costs are exceeded with each expansion of the group and its production.
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reaches its initial size again, which would have justiﬁed for the exiting member to
remain in the group. It might therefore be favorable for the member to choose the
option of protest, depending on the costs and beneﬁt that such a protest might
cause.
In case the member chooses the option voice and raises protest, there is a chance
that this protest would be eﬀective, and that the entrance of the new member into
the group could be prevented. This chance is depending on the total number of
group members and on the relative share of the protesting member in the total pro-
duction. The bigger the group is, the smaller is the chance to inﬂuence it. However,
the bigger the relative share of the objecting member in the total cooperative pro-
duction, the greater is the inﬂuence he or she might have on the group. The member
would therefore succeed to prevent more new entrances, and hold up the growth of
the group for a longer period before exiting. In case the protest is successful, the
protesting member has his or her aim achieved, he or she remains member in the
group and the group maintains its size G.
If the protest is not eﬀective, the new member is being accepted and the number of
members in the group shortly rises to G+ 1. The unsuccessfully protesting member
exits at this point and the number of members drops back to G.
The outcome of this strategic decision is therefore for the growth process of the
group insigniﬁcant. Whether a new potential member is rejected, or one of the group
members exits, the consequence for the growth of the group is one and the same; the
growth process stalls. However, as demonstrated at the beginning of this section, the
feature that does change with the expansion of the group is the frequency of these
occurrences, and the number of new potential members who are rejected, before
the group member who is objecting to the further growth exits. The frequency of
occurrences is a function of the total average production costs of the cooperative.
The number of times a member can prevent the acceptance of a new member is a
function of his or her inﬂuence in the group. The total average production costs
and the inﬂuence of the single member in the group are both functions of the size
that the group has reached2. The next section will feature the implication of these
recognitions to characterize a theoretical model for the growth of cooperative groups.
22.2. The Resulting Growth Characteristic of
Cooperative Groups
The resulting development of the number of group members is illustrated in the
following ﬁgure 22.2. The ﬁgure illustrates the development in the number of group
members over time. As shown in section 21.2, whether an unsatisﬁed member
chooses to exit the group or to object to the entrance of a new member, does not
change the ﬁnal resulting change in the number of the group members at the end of
the process. However, successfull prevention of new member entrances, might delay
the growth of the group for a longer period than an imediate exchange of old against
2For a detailed analysis of these dependencies refer again to section 21.4
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new members. The growth curve Gv in ﬁgure 22.2, illustrates the process of growth,
resulting under the assumption of no inﬂuence of the members on the decisions of
the group. namely the chance for eﬀective protest set as null, so that each point of
dissatisfaction, results in a member exchange and, therefore, one time-unit delay in
the process of growth. At each point of the growth curve, where one of the members
raises objection to further growth, we obtain a delay of one t-unit in the growth
(marked in ﬁgure 22.2 as ∂tW ). These incidents of member's dissatisfaction occur
increasingly frequent as the group grows and its total average costs, as already noted
in section 21.1 of this book, rise. As the frequency of member's dissatisfaction rises,
as argued in the previous section 22.1, the growth of the group becomes ever more
slowly over time, so that the number of the members in the group converges to a
certain limit. Curve Gs presents the continuous approximation of the growth and
line G∗ its limiting asymptote.
Figure 22.2.: The Change in the Number of Cooperative Members over Time, under
the Condition of No Member Inﬂuence on the Group
However, we do expect the members in the group to have a certain inﬂuence
on decision making, especially as long as the group is still relatively small. This
inﬂuence applies a certain chance for an eﬀective protest against the entrance of
new members. An unsatisﬁed member can thus prevent the entrance of a new
candidate over a few time periods (days, in our theoretical construct of one new
candidate a day), before he or she is forced to exit the group. The inﬂuence of the
single member on the group is therefore expressed by the length of period that he
or she manages to stall the further growth of the group before exiting. Since the
inﬂuence of a single member on the group is assumed to decrease with the increase
in the group's size, this period of growth stall becomes shorter, the larger the group
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becomes. This declining distortion eﬀect enforces an adjustment of the early stages
of the growth process, which results in a sigmoid curve, which converges to an upper
limit. Figure 22.3 illustrates the situation, given an existent inﬂuence of the members
in the group. Like in ﬁgure 22.2, curve Gv illustrates the process of group growth as
a function of t. At each point of the growth curve, where one of the members raises
his objection to further growth, we obtain a delay of ∂tI in the growth, additional
to the unit-delay ∂tI . Under the assumption of members' inﬂuence, the total delay
is longer than in the previous case, by the factor of the member's inﬂuence ∂tI . The
length of the delay caused by the members' inﬂuence ∂tI decreases, whereas the
incidents of dissatisfaction occur, like in the previous model, increasingly frequent
as the group grows and the total average costs of the cooperative production rise.
Curve Gs presents the continuous approximation of the growth and G∗ its limiting
asymptote. The dotted curve Gs0 in ﬁgure 22.3 is the growth curve without the
eﬀect of members' inﬂuence, taken as a reference from ﬁgure 22.2 to demonstrate
the change in the process of growth due to inﬂuence.
Figure 22.3.: The Change in the Number of Cooperative Members over Time, under
the Condition of Member Inﬂuence on the Group
The growth processions, illustrated in ﬁgures 22.2 and 22.3, as logical conclusions
resulting from the thought experiment conducted up to this point, are translated
into mathmatical terms in the following section 22.3, in order to create the empirical
mathematical model of group-growth as a process of member osmosis.
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22.3. A Mathematical Model for Members' Osmosis
into the Membership Idea
This section introduces an empirical mathematical model for group growth as an
osmotic process. It features the implementation of the recognitions achieved in
theoretic model, developed in the preceding sections of this chapter, into the osmotic
concept of ideas-evolution, formulated in chapters 15 and 16 of this book. Consider
group-membership as an idea. Actors who choose to adopt that idea, enter the
group in a process of osmosis, in which the the actors operate as the solvent and the
idea as the solute. The motion of actors from the position of non-members, through
the borders, into the hypothetical space of membership-idea, is expressed using the
model of the classical cell-osmometer [Philip, 1958]. For that purpose, we need to
immagine the group in an analogy to a spherical cell, featuring a deﬁned border
analogue to the cell wall, with the following properties:
 The geometrical limits of the group.
 The mechanical strength and elasticity supporting the turgor pressure.
 The semi-permeable membrane.
Formulating the dynamic model of the classical cell-osmometer for the case of the
group, we need to introduce the following symbols:
 G, the instantaneous group size analogue to the volume of the osmotic cell.
Measured as a product of the number of group members and a unit spherical
volume. attributed to each member. G0 presents the initial group size at the
point of minimal total average production costs of the group-enterprise, where
we set the time as t = t0.
 g = G/G0 − 1, the relative depature of the group size (i.e. cell volume) from
G0.
 A the surface area of the group borders. A0, the value of A at zero turgor
pressure.
 Lp, the premeability of the membrane to members.
 Φ, the osmotic pressure of the solution3. This osmotic pressure is analogue
to the osmotic potential gradient and expresses the groups attraction of new
members.
3The solution in our analogy consists of the actors in the system being the solvent, and the idea
of membership, being the solute. The membrane is deﬁned as featuring zero premeability to
the solute. That means, following the concept of osmosis of ideas formulated in chapter 16,
that the actors who choose to adopt the idea of membership, enter into the volume within the
borders of the cell, whereas those who abandon the idea exit the cell.
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 , the elasticity modulus of the cell wall.
 T , the turgor pressure within the cell, as a function of the surface area of the
spheric cell A and the elasticity modulus of the cell's border . The turgor
pressure at t0 is assumed to be zero.
Utilizing the deﬁned symbols, the process of group-growth through members' os-
mosis into the space of the membership idea, can be expressed through the following
equation:
dG
dt
= LpA(Φ− T ) (22.4)
Subject to the initial condition
t = 0, G = G0 (22.5)
We assume, that each member has the equivalent volume of one unit. The total
volume G of the group is therefore the sum of volumes of all members. We also
suppose that, initially, T = 0, as there is still no point of dissatisfaction occuring
within the group up to this point (as every extension of the group only caused further
decrease in the total average costs faced by the group).
Equation 22.4 cannot be integrated as it stands. However, Lp, A, Φ and T , are
all generally functions of G. If these functions are known, equation 22.4 can be
integrated. In order to solve the problem analytically, certain approximations are
necessary.
The permeability of natural membranes is expressed as the ﬂux of solvent pro unit
of time, pro unit membrane surface area and potential gradient. The permeability
of the group border to members is an outcome of the rule of acceptance of new
members, and the inﬂuence of existing members on the group. Exclusive clubs, for
instance accept or reject new membership through democratic decision procedures.
Co-operatives are basically open memberships, at least under German law. However,
members of the co-operative can stress their objection to further expansion of the
group and create internal pressure against it. We ﬁrst assume zero inﬂuence of the
members on the acceptance of new members, which means a random outcome of
either new members being rejected or existing members exiting the group in case
of dissatisfaction. For that reason we set Lp as constant (which we shall alter later
on).
Assuming a spheric space for the membership, the surface area of the border
increases with the volume of the space as according to the function
A(G) =
3
√
36piG
2
3 (22.6)
As seen form equation 22.6, for a volume G large enough, an increase in the
volume is not likely to change the order of magnitude of LpA, which aﬀects the time
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scale of the osmometer dynamics, though not its general character [Philip, 1958].
For simplifying the analysis, we can therefore consider LpA as a constant equal to
LpA0.
We deﬁned Φ as the group's attractiveness to new members. For this analysis we
assume an inﬁnite source for new members. Since the adaptation of the membership-
idea implies entrance into the space of the group, we exclude the option of remaining
outside the group and beneﬁtting from its performance. The number of actors
sharing the same idea, does not change ceteris paribus the utility from the idea.
Since the entrance of members does not change the osmotic potential within the
group borders, the gradient of potentials, drawing the members from outside into
the group is supposed to insigniﬁcantly change with the growth of the group, and
therefore, to remain constant.
The remaining component of equation 22.4 to be considered is the turgor pressure
T , which is the pressure resisting the motion of members into the group-space, or
pressing others out of it. While we assumed a constant gradient, pulling members
from the environment into the group, as argued in the theory, growing dimensions
of the enterprise run by the group, raise the average total costs of production over-
proportionally. It is for that reason, that the turgor pressure within the cell rises
proportional to its volume. This hydrostatic preasure analogue within the cell,
causes the exit of new and old members4 back to the system environment. We
can therefore observe this pressure as the frequency of occurance of dissatisfaction
situtations as a result of group's expansion, i.e. this frequency is a function of the
average total costs function, which is in its turn a function of the group's expansion.
The relation of T to the group's expansion is expressed through the elastic modulus
of the cell , so that
T = g (22.7)
which is to be empirically determined for the speciﬁc group according to its respec-
tive average total costs function. We can hence rewrite equation 22.4 as:
dG
dt
= LpA0Φ− LpA0 
G0
G+ LpA0 (22.8)
For simplicity of writing in the next steps, we substitute a for the constant expres-
sion LpA0 G0 and b for LpA0(Φ + ). Rearranging, we obtain the linear diﬀerential
function
dG
dt
+ aG = b (22.9)
The solution of which would be
G = C exp(−at) + b
a
(22.10)
4In the absence of explicit inﬂuence of the persistent members over the acceptance or rejection
of new members, we consider a random determination of which members ﬂow out, the new or
the old.
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where C is an arbitrary constant. Letting dG
dt
= 0 and solving for G, we can observe
that the solution 22.10 converges to b/a as t → ∞, corresponding to ﬁgure 22.2 in
section 22.2.
Substituting a and b with their original expressions, we receive the function of
group growth over time
G = C exp(−LpA0 
G0
t) +
LpA0(Φ + )
LpA0

G0
= C exp(−LpA0 
G0
t) +G0(
Φ

+ 1)
(22.11)
and the asymptote of the growth appears as G0(Φ + 1). We can obviously see, that
the maximal size of the group is a function of its initial size G0 at t = 0, and the
relation between its attractivity to new members Φ and its elastic modulus , i.e.
its internal resistance to growth.
Based on the initial osmosis function 22.4, we now introduce the element of
member-inﬂuence into the process of growth. The inﬂuence of an unsatisﬁed mem-
ber can cause the rejection of a new member at the border of the group. The higher
the inﬂuence, the longer is the period, and therefore the higher is the number of
rejected new members, before the unsatisﬁed member leaves the group. The quote
of prevented new entrances, out of the total of entrance attempts, is therefore a
resulting measure for the permeability of the group's border. Other than in the
ﬁrst model, in which we assumed a constant permeability of the border, under the
assumption of member-inﬂuence, the permeability, as an expression of the declin-
ing member-inﬂuence, is increasing as a function of the group's size. In order to
quantify it in economic terms, member-inﬂuence on decision-making in the group is
expressed by the costs of pivoting an election (corresponding to the costs of voice,
illustrated in section 21.3). Simpliﬁed5, we assume a linear dependency between the
permeability and the group's size, with the ratio coeﬁcient γ, so that:
Lp(G) = L0γG(t) (22.12)
whereas L0 is the permeability of the border at t0. Hence, the higher the costs of
comunication or the number of members in the group, the lower is the inﬂuence of
the individual members and the decision-making of the group, and therefore, the
higher is the permeability Lp(G). Inserting Lp(G) into the osmosis function 22.4, we
obtain the diﬀerential equation for group growth under changing member inﬂuence6
dG(t)
dt
= Lp(G(t))A(Φ− T(G(t))) = (L0γG(t))A(Φ− (G(t)
G0
− 1)) (22.13)
Rearranging, we obtain
dG(t)
dt
= L0γG(t)A(Φ− G(t)
G0
+ ) = L0γA(Φ + )G(t)− L0γA
G0
G(t)2 (22.14)
5For an extensive consideration of the costs of pivoting the result of an election and their depen-
dency on jurisdiction size, refer to [Taylor & Yildirim, 2005], and [Borck, 2002].
6For deeper disquisition of the mathematical methodology here, refer to e.g: [Vogels et al., 1975]
and [Krabs, 1997].
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Applying the substitutions
a = L0γA(Φ + ), b =
L0γA
G0
(22.15)
we obtain the simpliﬁed linear diﬀerential equation:
dG
dt
= aG(t)− bG(t)2 (22.16)
with certain constants a, b which fulﬁll the conditions a > b and b > 0. The sigmoid
character of the growth-curve is already visible from the equation. As long as the
group G(t) is small enough, the term bG(t)2 is considerably smaller than aG(t), so
that equation 22.16 expresses an exponential growth. Only after G(t) has accom-
plished a suﬃcient growth, the inﬂuence of the term bG(t)2 becomes bigger and the
growth converges to a certain limit.
Given the initial group size G(t0) = G0 > 0 for t0 ≥ 0 and applying the method
of separation of variables, the following law of growth can be derived:
G(t) =
aG0exp[a(t)]
a− bG0 + bG0exp[a(t)] (22.17)
As in the previous model, the growth function converges to a certain constant:
lim
t→∞G(t) =
a
b
(22.18)
This is the constant limit to growth, which appears in ﬁgure 22.3 as the limit size
G∗. Substituting the constants a and b with their original expressions, as deﬁned in
22.15, we obtain the same value for the asymptote, known from the model without
member-inﬂuence: G0(Φ + 1).
In addition to that it becomes apparent, that the size of the group G = G(t)
is a monotonous increasing function in t ≥ t0, when G0 ≤ ab and a monotonous
decreasing function when G0 ≥ ab . Thus the intuitive expectation is expressed, that
the group would adjust its size downwards in case of - for instance - a shift of the
asymptote due to changes in the market situation, or in case the group is suddenly
bigger than its asymptotical size after a merger between two cooperatives. The
members would react to the new cost-beneﬁt situation and adjust their number to
the new optimum accordingly. Moreover, for the case G0 = ab , in which the number
of members at the beginning of growth measuring complies with the limit of growth
under the given circumstances, the size of the the group does not change over time,
so that G(t) = a
b
= G0 for all t ≥ t0.
The inﬂection point ts of function G = G(t) follows from the demand G¨(ts) = 0.
The diﬀerential equation yields:
G¨(ts) = aG˙(ts)− 2bG(ts)G˙(ts) = (a− 2bG(ts))G(ts)(a− bG(ts)) = 0 (22.19)
Therefore in case G0 > ab ⇒ G(t) > ab for all t ≥ t0, no inﬂection point is possible.
In case G0 < ab ⇒ G(t) < ab for all t ≥ t0, only one inﬂection is possible, which is
the solution of the equation: G(ts) = a2b .
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22.3 A Mathematical Model for Members' Osmosis into the Membership Idea
The parameters a, b of the growth law 22.17 are determined by the distribution
of the members' alternative production costs and by the procession of the total
average production costs of the cooperative. These are hard to calculate, but may
empirically be found through the choice of three points t1 < t2 < t3, so that t1 > 0
and t2 − t1 = t3 − t2, and the calculation of the values G(t1), G(t2) and G(t3).
That way, with a relatively small amount of data, a growth process of an observed
cooperative can be analyzed to determine its mathematical function  and by that
 its limit of growth can be predicted.
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Growth of Cooperative Groups
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CHAPTER
TWENTYTHREE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIMITED GROWTH FOR
COOPERATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The models of group growth formulated in the preceding chapter 22 point out the
notion, that a group of co-operating agents features a limited ability to grow, which
lies at the base of its very own nature. This feature implies an adaptation in the
evaluation of co-operatives' performance. In this work we observe the co-operative
as a group of individuals, in which each member inﬂuences the behavior of the
group as a whole. Using strategic decisions theoretical principles while considering
the complex interests of the individual group-members, their strategic choices and
the power of the individual to inﬂuence the group, we point out that the members
limit the growth of their own group. We also show that the natural development
of the number of group-members, under set economic environmental conditions,
will feature the asymptotic form, which is characteristic to biological growth or
thermodynamic osmosis processes. This might stand in contradiction to the common
expectation from a prosperous organization to feature a constant growth in order
to be evaluated as prosperous. However, just like in growth mechanisms of natural
(and human) populations, the number of group members can only be expected to
grow and converge to a certain limit, which it would not exceed without a change
in its living conditions. Similarly to the availability of space and other resources,
which need to be extended in order to allow constant growth of natural populations,
limited members' beneﬁts from membership, determine a limitation for the growth
of a cooperative group itself. Through their individual decisions and membership
behavior, the members regulate the size of their own group.
This attribute of limited growth capability has been recognized and described
by several scientists already. However while quite a few authors ﬁnd a conﬂict
between the interest of the co-operative to extend its membership in order to ob-
tain competitive market positions through economies of scale [Fulton, 1999], or to
raise capital [Nilsson J., 2008], and between the danger of losing on member ad-
hesion and commitment, demanding adaptations of management strategies and
organization structures to confront this problem [Nilsson J., 2008, Fulton, 1999,
Butler & USDA, 1988], we relate a rather self regulative characteristic to the co-
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operative in its environment. For this purpose we observe the co-operative as a
population and its behavior as the behavior of the sum of its members. Also the
performance of the organization is therefore just as good as the sum of its members
is wishing it to be. Those particular members, who are not satisﬁed with the per-
formance of the group to the extent that they prefer an alternative, and for whom
the cost-beneﬁt relation of attempting to inﬂuence it is disadvantageous, exit the
organization. We can therefore claim (and many empirical surveys seem to support
this) that the members are basically satisﬁed with their group. This empirical result
is not very surprising as long as surveys consider only the population of individuals
who are members of the organization at the point of time when the survey is being
conducted. Those who are (really) not satisﬁed with membership are not members
(anymore). As contrary to the tendency of organization performance-evaluation
concepts, which often name growth as a necessary indicator of success, a non grow-
ing group should not be considered as unsuccessful. For the sum of its members it is
actually just as successful as it could be considering its environmental circumstances.
The net number of group members is therefore only an external characteristic of
the organization. Even after the group has accomplished its phase of growth and
the number of its members does not seem to change, the movement of members
into, through and out of the group still continues as an internal activity of the vivid
organization [Lasowski & Kühl, 2009]. Consider a schematic market environment
as illustrated in ﬁgure 23.1. The market environment is illustrated as a pool, in
which a population of enterprises of diﬀerent sizes exist. This pool contains an
internal environment within it in form of a vertical pipe, representing the cooperative
organization, so that some of the enterprises are located within the pipe and some
outside of it. The enterprises within the pipe are representing the group of enterprises
which are members in the cooperative.
Figure 23.1.: The Cooperative Organization in its Market Environment
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While new members, whose opportunity costs are lower and therefore their net
utility from membership is positive, continue entering the organization, the total
number of members is only balanced by other members who exit it. Those who exit
the organization are those members who feature higher market chances and whose
opportunity cost of membership exceeds its utility. The logical consequence of this
observation is that the organization is performing as a market elevator, where weaker
members continuously enter the organization from underneath, whilst stronger mem-
bers leave it from above and return to the market at a much improved position1.
This performance of the organization might be latent to the observer at ﬁrst sight.
But if two conditions are fulﬁlled, namely a constant number of members in the
organization and a continuous movement of members through it, we can emanate
from it that the organization is playing a formidable role in shaping and regulating
the market environments within which it acts.
1Deriving from the reasoning at the base of this work, no enterprise would enter the organization
if it can do better in the alternative market, or leave it if it has an advantage within the
organization over acting on the market
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CHAPTER
TWENTYFOUR
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIMITED GROWTH FOR
COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT
The co-operative is by its nature, not only a form of enterprise governance, but also
a group of individuals who join their forces in order to fulﬁll a common economical
purpose. By serving a common cause, the members of the group also fulﬁll a se-
ries of personal - non economical - needs. The accumulation of these needs is the
glue holding co-operative organizations together, usually recognized as members'
commitment. Agricultural and food markets are undergoing a constant change, as
borders break down, trade barriers fall and multinational market actors are entering
market they have traditionally ignored. Modern retail markets are increasingly char-
acterized by highly concentrated structures. Agricultural markets feature increasing
industrialization and a liberalized trade. These processes set major structural chal-
lenges for co-operatives as they are forced to respond by merging and ﬁnding new
ways of raising capital. In order to keep up with competition and to maintain their
bargaining power in these markets, co-operative market-actors are forced to expand
their structures to ever growing dimensions. While serving the cause of maintaining
competitiveness, increasing the size of the group has a negative inﬂuence on the
group-perception of the individual member. The glue holding these groups together
is loosening as a direct result of organizational growth.
One could wish to ﬁnd the solution for that conﬂict in the process of concentra-
tion, observed in many markets. Ever growing market shares are controlled by a
decreasing number of market actors, which, however, are increasing in size. This
can be observed in the development of the inner structure of many cooperatives as
well, where the numbers of members are declining and at the same time the coop-
erative enterprises maintain their sizes or even grow. However this process conceals
a danger in it. Striving for a relative small group of larger members might lead
to a self selection of groups, where members who possess an economical advantage
split from the main group to create exclusive groups of their own and thus, contrary
to the original ideas of the co-operative movement, exclude smaller economically
weaker members. Therefore it is and should be the challenge of the co-operative
management, to extend and expand the co-operative enterprise without losing on
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members' commitment at the same time.
This recognition is crucial ﬁrst of all for the mere understanding of group-dynamics
in general and of the co-operative group in particular. Moreover, it is essential for
understanding the diﬃculties and limitations co-operatives face concerning their
ability to keep up with structural challenges created by modern food and agricul-
tural markets. And ﬁnally, this recognition is crucial for the correct conception of
imperatives for the design and adaptation of management tactics and strategies for
growing co-operative groups.
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Part V.
Conclusion
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CHAPTER
TWENTYFIVE
SUMMARY
The initial motivation for this work has been to explore new alternative perspectives
for the assessment of co-operative organizations. This special species of enterprises
features a unique attribute, deferring it from all other enterpreneural forms. It is
constructed of a group of individuals, with all the psychological and social conse-
quences. This unique feature of this type of organization has enabled the special
examination conducted in this work; the analysis of the organization from a popu-
lation ecological perspective. Part II of this work attempts to illustrate this special
feature and justify conducting the examination of the subject from a population
evolutionary perspective.
Trying to imply the term populations ecology into a socio-economic context, it is
unavoidable to confront several issues. The ﬁrst of those is the association of this
term with its common use in the organizational economic context, which almost
automatically leads the line of thought along the conventional patterns. Ever since
the publishing of Hannan and Freeman's work [Hannan & Freeman, 1982], popula-
tions ecology has been used by organizational economists to describe the dynamics
of organizations populations in their market-environments, attributing a feature of
a life cycle to organizations and utilizing this forced feature to describe and explain
market dynamics. In this work, the evolutionary logic has been utilized to explain
the dynamic existence of the organization itself. The population referred to in this
work is the population of diﬀerent ideas, among which the idea of organization mem-
bership. To population of members and non-members serves here as the analogy to
the actual selecting environment.
A second issue to be confronted is the tensioned relationship between economics
and the life sciences, which comes to its full expression in the context of the use of
evolutionary logic. In an attempt to release some of this pressure and to encourage
a more intensive exchange of understandings and ideas between socio-economic and
life sciences, several resent developments and recognitions of life sciences have been
illustrated, which surprisingly reduce the logical discrepancies between the disci-
plines. Part III of this work features the treatment of evolution in life and social
sciences, and suggests a new concept for evolution and the population ecology of
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ideas, combined with its application to the special case of the group membership
idea.
Part IV of this work features the implementation of the recognitions, achieved in
the preceding parts, into an empirical model that analyzes the behavior of individu-
als considering the membership in a co-operative group, and the resulting dynamic
development process of the group itself. The basis for this model is a simpliﬁcation
of group cohesion into the frame of individual rationality. Membership-incentives
are expressed merely through the costs of exit, increasing anonymity and decreas-
ing inﬂuence of the individual member on the group are expressed by the costs of
voice, and all these are analyzed in the face of opportunity costs, expressed by the
conditions oﬀered by a competitor or by other market opportunities. These three
elements are suﬃcient for demonstrating that the tendency of members to leave a
co-operative group is increasing as the group grows. This notion is satisfactory for
the justiﬁcation of an analogy of organizational dynamics to biological growth mod-
els [Lasowski & Kühl, 2006], whereas the growing tendency of individuals to leave
the group is  in its sense  nothing else than the analogue of increasing death rates
in growing populations.
Classic Organizations theory is devided into two main modelling approaches: The
rational and the natural perspectives. The rational instrumental approach re-
lates to organizations as instruments that could be consciously designed to achieve
deﬁned goals and ends. The assumption at the base of this approach is that or-
ganizations can be rationally planned and shaped to achieve their goals, and that
the goals, the means to achieve them and the resulting development of the system
can be controlled by participants. By contrast, the natural perspective observes
organzations as organic systems, underlying spontaneous, indeterminate processes.
This work takes on the lead of modern organizational theory, emphasizing mecha-
nistic rationality and at the same time natural organic principles. Developmental
processes are illustrated as the outcome of a complex of meta processes, which are
not totally controllable as an instrument in the hand of a dictating entity. How-
ever, just as well as natural processes, organizational system developments feature
regularities, which may be empirically studied, understood and even implied for
reaching predeﬁned goals. Therefore, even if we agree that social systems feature
natural organic attributes and there is therefore only a limited possibility to con-
troll its outcomes, there is still a great necessity to learn the regularities in the
system mechanisms. Figuratively put, natural scientists are certainly not able to
control a hurican approaching a city. But if they learn the regularities typical to
the meteorological system, then they can better estimate the hurican and predict
its intensity and evacuate the city on time to inﬂuence the storm's consequences.
In that sense, concerning social systems as organic should direct their investiga-
tion to better understanding of the regularities at their basis. And the recognitions
achieved by these investigations, should be implied into imperatives enabling better
instrumentalization of organizational systems.
That is probably the main achievement of this work. It features the applica-
tion of available recognitions concerning co-operative organizations and their hybrid
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character as social groups and economic enterprises. Through the formulation of
the impact of social and economic mechanisms in quantitative economic terms, a
general formal expression of the group development process is being achieved. This
expression enables the application of established mathematical growth models as
an instrument for the assessment of group performance, and for the generation of
liable prognoses considering the development of co-operative groups in the future.
Moreover, observing the organization and its members from an evolutionary  pop-
ulations ecological  perspective, delivers a powerful instrument and at the same
time a new perspective for the assessment of co-operative and perhaps other orga-
nizational performance.
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CHAPTER
TWENTYSIX
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Economic sciences enjoy an advantageous positioning at the overlap between social
and life sciences. Traditionally, the relation to this positioning is limited to the
application of mathematical methods and instruments for the analysis of the socio-
psychological phenomenon called economics. However, other social sciences serve
themselves increasingly from advances in life sciences and technologies. Psychology
itself seems to become evermore clinical, employing the recognitions of neurobiol-
ogy and new technologies of brain scanning, bio-chemistry and medicine. Despite
an increasing penetration and development of psychological methods of behavioral
research, and the application of clinical technologies of brain imaging, there is still a
remarkable (perhaps traditional) resistance which seems to exist for the acceptance
of clinical perspectives into economic disciplines.
It would be tragic if that should remain the case. Economic scholars could gain
from contemporary advances in life sciences, if they cease to reject the penetration of
clinical mind research into the schools of economics and, instead, seek for increased
dialog and mutual inspiration with psychological, medical and clinical researchers.
Nevertheless, there have been great achievements reached by contemporary ex-
perimental neuroeconomics. Thanks to advances in neurologic brain mapping and
bio-psychology, and the integration of behavioral economics, researchers could de-
tect and locate diﬀerent cognitive and emotional reactions and interactions of the
distinctive responsible brain areas to economic stimuli. Observations of behavioral
experimental economists could be observed, conﬁrmed and supported by neurolo-
gists. However, due to technical limitations of the measurement instruments avail-
able at the moment, the observations are limited to snap-shots of brain regions and
their reactions. There is still a broad ﬁeld for further developments in the imaging
of the ﬂow of consequent emotional and cognitive activities, reactions, interactions
and decisional processed of the brain and its diﬀerent areas. An improved temporal
resolution and rendering techniques would enable researchers to pinpoint the inﬂu-
ence of triggering stimuli and reaction processes and their advance throughout the
neurologic and endocrinologic systems.
An immediate matter for investigation that could be delivered through this work,
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is the process of stress reaction to decision situations, as formulated through the
general logic scheme for strategic decisions created in chapter 18 of this work. Ac-
cording to this scheme, every strategic decision is a combination and conﬁguration
of elements from two decisions-dimensions: The ﬁrst dimension is the choice of en-
vironment (Go where?). The second dimension is the choice to either adapt the
environment of activity or to adapt oneself to the environment (Do what?). This
general scheme applies to any imaginable strategic decision, whether it is the case
of economic decisions, the decision to maintain a marriage, belong to a group or
accept a complex of ideas (exit-voice-acquiesce decisions) or even survival-relevant
decisions in a ﬁght-ﬂight-cope decision situation.
Fight-ﬂight-cope decisions are being conducted in high stress situations. Neu-
rological experiments of decision making processes have yielded several recogni-
tions considering the inﬂuence of stress on decision making mechanisms, whereas
behavioural economic experiments delivered evidence concerning the inﬂuences of
stress on choices and their resulting successfulness. Other experiments have demon-
strated the activation of the major part of the brain, associated with non conscious-
ness, in addition to (in fact even short before) the parts of the brain associated with
consciousness and rationality, during the making of very simple (motor movement)
decisions. However, there is also psychological evidence that the abundance of choice
in modern life makes people less happy. There is therefore a good reason to assume,
that not only survival relevant decisions, but also simple decisions and choice situa-
tions, trigger the activation of non conscious areas of the brain, in particular those
areas of the brain responsible for triggering physiological stress reactions, usually
related to ﬁght-or-ﬂight mechanisms.
The main question that is still to be explored is what actually happens ﬁrst? Is
there a mechanism evaluating whether a decision situation is acute or not, and then
determining which areas of the brain are to be activated, or are the same areas
of the brain being triggered at any decision-making situation? And if the latter
is the case, is there physiological strain being induced on the rest of the organism
by the process of decision making, or can regulation mechanisms interrupt and
eliminate stress signals from the brain in case these are not justiﬁed in the given
situation? Does an aversive stimulus cause the activation of ﬁght-or-ﬂight activity
modus, which in its turn activates decision making organs? Or does decision making
itself trigger the activation of all relevant brain areas, including those which are
associated with survival relevant under-stress-decisions? For the determination of
causal relationships between decision making and stress, a very precise record of
the order of events (stimuli, activation of brain areas, decision and action) in a
combined system is highly signiﬁcant. The solution for these questions wold be
to gain insight into the progression of brain reactions during non stressful decision
situations (such as the choice between two rewards). The employment of MRI
technologies could provide this insight and enable the registration of the loci and
order of brain activation.
The recognitions gained through the insight into the physiology of interdepen-
dencies between stress and decision making, would have direct consequences for
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psychology, personal and organizational coaching, as well as for economics. It would
deliver complementing physiological perspectives for the understandings of bounded
rationality, consumer choices, ﬁnance market behaviour and many others.
The co-operative organization, serving as the central pillar for the construction
of this work, is an extensively investigated and a well documented organizational
model. As an economic enterprise, the co-operative organization is subject to sim-
ilar forces, mechanisms and inﬂuences as other organization forms existing in their
environment. It is therefore not their existence as economic enterprises that makes
them unique and interesting. It is rather their inner structure, consisting of a social
group of members, which makes them unique. As a voluntary and open member-
ship, controlled by democratic participation of their members, co-operatives feature
a well characterized social construct with well deﬁned and formulated play rules. As
such, the co-operative delivers a frutile ground for social, psychological and economic
investigation.
It is still much more common, that recognitions from other disciplines are de-
rived to advance co-operative research. For example, organizations economics have
already been implied to analyse co-operative organizational issues. However, much
more recognitions from co-operative research should be derived to advance the un-
derstanding of general socio economic issues. For instance, the application of the
notion of membership idea into general socio-economic evolution, as conducted in
this work, could contribute to the general understanding of social evolution, more
than it could contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms shaping the co-
operatives themselves. The potential of co-operative research is not concealed in
what can still be learned about this form of organization. Much more it is contained
in what can be learned from this form of organization about social groups, indi-
viduals and the dynamic interactions between those. Co-operative organizations
should therefore draw more attention of additional socio economic research disci-
plines, other than those directly associated with the co-operative theme at present.
The co-operative organization conceals a high potential as a subject for experimen-
tation and analysis, delivering substantial recognitions about such issues as social
mechanisms, individual and group interactions and behavior, ecological and evolu-
tionary economics, behavioral and cognitive decision making and much more.
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